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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I investigate consumer responses to two forms of information
provision in the seafood market: health information campaigns and genetically modified
food labels. Using data from a seafood auction experiment, I explore sources of
heterogeneity among auction participants and their responses to health information in
the context of current United States Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human
Services policy goals using a mixed effects finite mixture model. My second and third
chapters explore the potential effect of the forthcoming National Bioengineered Food
Disclosure Standard on demand for genetically modified seafood. Considering the new
labeling standard and the development of a genetically modified fish I collect data using
an online choice experiment to investigate 1) consumer preferences and willingness to
pay for Atlantic Salmon fillets with labels denoting the presence or absence of GM
technology and 2) influence of behavioral measures on consumer preference for GM
seafood using an application of machine learning techniques. The use of these
techniques allows for rigorous identification of treatment effects that hold important
implications for policy makers in the ever adapting “Information Age.”
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PREFACE
I use manuscript format for this dissertation. There are three independent
chapters which constitute the entire work. The goal of this dissertation is to build
understanding of consumer choice in the context of seafood. The first manuscript is
co-authored with Hirotsugu Uchida, Cathy Roheim, and Robert Johnston. It is being
prepared for submission to the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. The
second manuscript is co-authored with Hirotsugu Uchida and Maya Vadiveloo. It is
being prepared for submission to Food Policy. The third manuscript is co-authored
with Thomas Sproul. It is being prepared for submission to Sustainability.
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PURCHASE BEHAVIOR, TRUST OF ACADEMIC SOURCED
INFORMATION AND AGGREGATION EFFECTS IN CONSUMER
RESPONSE TO HEALTH INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS
(To be submitted to American Journal of Agricultural Economics)
By
Michael J. Weir a, Hirotsugu Uchida a, Cathy Roheim b, and Robert J. Johnston c
a

Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode
Island, Kingston, RI
b

Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Idaho,
Moscow, Idaho
c

Department of Economics, Clark University, Worcester Massachusetts

Abstract
Using data from a seafood auction experiment, we use a mixed-effects finite mixture
model to explore sources of heterogeneity among participants and their responses to
health information in the context of current United States Departments of Agriculture
and Health and Human Services policy goals. We identify two distinct groups of
consumers based on seafood purchase behavior, seafood lifestyle, and trust in seafood
information sources. The majority of our sample is classified as “trust academics” and
respond to both health benefit and risk information. The remaining portion of our
sample is classified as “specialty store shoppers” and significantly respond to seafood
health risk campaigns. We find evidence that female auction participants drive the
significant information effects in each class. We highlight how these findings may be
used in future seafood health information campaigns.

1

1.1 Introduction
While global consumption of seafood continues to exhibit strong growth (FAO 2016),
the recommended intake of fish is generally not achieved by consumers in the United
States, and while many consumers perceive seafood as healthy, they lack specific
knowledge of health benefits (Carlucci et al. 2015; Jahns et al. 2014). To combat this,
the U.S. market for seafood has been flooded with both public and private sources of
information related to health risks and benefits of seafood consumption. The
consensus from the medical literature on these health risk/benefit tradeoffs related to
seafood is that greater consumption of seafood is warranted for most groups (Nesheim
and Yaktine 2007). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) recently recommended that pregnant and
nursing women consume at least 8 to 12 ounces of a variety of seafood per week as
part of a well-balanced diet, with a similar recommendation for other adults, and less
for young children (USDA and HHS 2010).
It is unclear, however, whether these information help consumers make more
informed choices based on balancing the health benefits and risks associated with
various seafood products (Shimshack, Ward, and Beatty 2007; Marette et al. 2008;
Nesheim and Yaktine 2007; Sha et al. 2015). In recent years, economists have focused
their efforts on evaluating the impact of both consumer health risk and benefit
perceptions on food demand (Shogren et al. 1999; Lusk et al. 2004; Lusk and Coble
2005; Rousu and Shogren 2006; Huffman et al. 2007; Teisl and Roe 2010; Heiman
and Lowengart 2011). While there have been studies on consumer preferences,
knowledge, and behavior related to other food products, with particular focus on meat
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products, the application of these results to seafood is limited (Verbeke et al. 2008;
Johnston and Roheim 2006). In fact, a National Academies study concluded that
“research is needed to develop and evaluate more effective communication tools for
use when conveying the health benefits and risks of seafood consumption” (Nesheim
and Yaktine 2007). We answer this call by not only evaluating the effectiveness of
information campaigns, but by also highlighting how differences in demographics may
mediate information’s effectiveness.
Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017) conducted a series of experiments with
the goal of understanding whether the health-related information currently provided to
the public are effective at motivating changes in seafood consumption. Consumer
choices were elicited through an experimental auction that simulated actual market
purchase decisions, in which respondents could bid for different types of seafood
characterized by distinct risk and benefit profiles. These bids were then used to
estimate consumers’ changes in willingness to pay (WTP) for seafood products given
the different information treatments. Their study found, among other things, that there
is significant heterogeneity among individual preferences for seafood and how auction
participants react to the information treatment. Specifically, all random parameters in
their linear mixed model were statistically significant. Further investigation on the
nature of heterogeneity, however, was not conducted and is the main objective of the
current article.
Using the experimental auction data from Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston
(2017), this article analyzes the nature and characteristics of preference heterogeneity
found by that study. It explores factors which may explain heterogeneous responses to
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information treatments to better understand the components influencing these demand
shifts. Unlike most latent class analyses in the literature, which typically use discrete
dependent variables, our dependent variable is a bid-difference (i.e., continuous) and
as such employs the more general finite mixture model to explain heterogeneity in
WTP changes (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). This framework models heterogeneity
within a finite number of classes based on responses to information related to the
health risks and benefits of seafood consumption. We classify two consumer groups
based on the premium1 assigned to information provided during the auction
experiment and identify defining characteristics of these groups based on
demographics, prior beliefs, and behavioral intentions collected in a pre-auction
survey. The analyses reveal primary seafood purchase location and trust in seafood
information sources as the defining characteristics of the two classes and thus their
response to the information provided. We find that health benefit information does
have an influence in promoting healthy seafood consumption once we account for the
identified preference heterogeneity. This result adds nuance to the findings of Uchida,
Roheim, and Johnston (2017) by incorporating individual-level seafood preference
data. This allows for targeting future information campaigns to specific sub-groups of
the population. Our results also highlight the effect aggregation can have on model
results by masking important sub-sample differences.
The rest of the article is outlined as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on
seafood consumer heterogeneity. Section 3 discusses the general set up and execution
of the auction experiment from which the data was collected. Section 4 provides the

We are using the term ‘premium’ simply as a shorthand for ‘difference in WTP before and after the
information treatment,’ which can be both positive or negative.
1
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motivation for exploring the heterogeneity of participants. Section 5 introduces the
estimated model. Section 6 presents findings. In section 7 we further discuss our
findings and provide some concluding remarks in section 8.
1.1.1 Food choices and preference heterogeneity
Empirical analysis on consumer preferences often assumes homogeneous preferences
within a sample due to the complexity of properly accounting for preference
heterogeneity. McFadden (1986) recognized the value in controlling for perceptions,
beliefs, preferences, behavioral intentions, and socioeconomic factors in consumer
research. In the context of food choice, understanding preference heterogeneity is an
important issue in examining consumer behavior, particularly in development of
marketing strategies (Onozaka, Hansen, and Sørvig 2014). Preference heterogeneity
also plays an important role in how consumers interpret information about food
products (Verbeke et al. 2008; Carlucci et al. 2015).
Aside from differences in consumer perceptions and attitudes, demographic
characteristics can also influence food choice. In particular, age, gender, educational
attainment, household size, age of children, and income all have been identified to
influence seafood consumption as well as other foods deemed healthy in the medical
literature (Samoggia and Castellini 2018; Dolgopolova and Teuber 2018). Using data
from the 2005 – 2010 National Health and Nutrition Examinations Surveys
(NHANES), Jahns et al. (2014) report that while 80% of survey respondents
consumed seafood within thirty days of survey completion, respondents that were
younger, earned lower income, and attained lower education levels had statistically
significant lower odds of being a seafood consumer. Of those considered seafood
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consumers, respondents that were women, younger aged, and less educated ate less
seafood relative to other seafood consumers.
The majority of work on consumer heterogeneity and food choice has come in
the realm of meat deriving from livestock, with results that may not directly apply to
seafood choice (Johnston and Roheim 2006). Meat and seafood products are markedly
different in relation to general perceptions; meat products are often the subject of
scrutiny in the media due to controversial production and/or processing techniques
(Fox, Hayes, and Shogren 2002), food safety incidents (Gellynck, Verbeke, and
Vermeire 2006), and more recently issues of animal welfare (Tonsor and Olynk 2011;
Lusk and Norwood 2011). Seafood, on the other hand, is generally viewed in a
positive light and is considered healthy (Verbeke et al. 2008; Carlucci et al. 2015),
although farmed seafood does receive its fair share of criticisms and negative press
(Sha et al. 2015).
In this article, we investigate the factors associated with heterogeneity in
consumer preferences for seafood. Using a classification approach, such as a finite
mixture model, we can further the research on consumer heterogeneity focusing on
those key perception and demographic differences previously identified. This will add
to our understanding of how different consumer groups respond to information meant
to promote healthful food consumption. Understanding of how information campaigns
are effective for different types of consumers is important for the development of
marketing and pricing policies related to healthy foods (Dolgopolova and Teuber
2018). Given that seafood intake in the U.S. population is still below recommended
levels, particularly in low-income consumers and women (Mancino et al. 2018; U.S.

6

Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Agriculture 2015;
Jahns et al. 2014), this article provides a timely analysis of seafood consumer
segments with the goal of identifying groups of seafood consumers based on their
response to information and how these groups may differ. We identify two distinct
segments of consumers in our sample that differ by seafood purchase behavior,
seafood lifestyle, and trust in seafood information sources. Specifically, we find that
the majority of our sample, what we refer to as the “trust academics” group, is
receptive to both risk- and benefit-focused information campaigns, a result not
identified by Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017). Our findings can inform future
information campaign design and implementation that are more targeted and effective
at improving the public’s health and food literacy (Palumbo et al. 2019).
1.2 Data
The auction experiment was conducted between November 2012 and July 2013 in
various locations across the state of Rhode Island. The auction employed a secondprice sealed-bid format (Uchida et al. 2014; Fox et al. 1998; Lusk et al. 2001;
Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer 2002), in which participants bid on wild
salmon, farmed salmon, and swordfish. These products were chosen based on (i) their
particular profile of health risks and benefits, (ii) their frequent appearance in guidance
related to seafood consumption, and (iii) their familiarity to consumers in our study
area (Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston 2017).
The experiment design is detailed in Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017);
here we present the key components. Three products were bid on simultaneously, so
that each participant submitted three bids in each round. There were six rounds in total
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with two information interventions at the end of the second and fourth round. These
two interventions were designed to separate the effect of information content and
information source. The first information intervention was on the health benefits/risks
related to seafood consumption without revealing the source of said information; the
second information revealed the source (e.g., U.S. government (FDA), seafood
industry, NGO, and scientists). The experiment also included sessions without any
information interventions to serve as control group. At the end of the sixth round, one
round was chosen at random and the winner of the chosen round received the seafood
voucher that was redeemable for the seafood products at a local supermarket. Each
participant was given $70 as an allowance. The winner took the voucher and change in
cash; others took $70 in cash. In total we completed 32 experimental auction sessions
with 360 total participants.
Unfortunately, we did detect some participants acting strategically to simply
pocket the $70 cash allowance. Following Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017), we
define “non-engaging participants” as anyone bidding less than $0.50 for all three
products throughout the entire six rounds of the auction. This definition resulted in
dropping twenty participants from the analysis, resulting in a sample size of n = 340.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample and Table 1.2 gives a summary
of the number of participants receiving each information treatment.
One of the key findings in Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017) was that there
was no impact of health benefit information on WTP regardless of the message type or
publishing source; however, health risk information was effective at changing
participants’ WTP. This is evidence that current health information campaigns do not
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help consumers balance the benefits and risks of consuming seafood, but rather leads
them to react more strongly to health risk information. We seek to understand further
what drives consumer response to information campaigns.
1.2.1 Exploring Heterogeneous Preferences for Seafood
Given our sample consists of Rhode Island residents and is similar in terms of
demographics relative to the Rhode Island population (table 1.1), we have a good
starting point to explore the underlying heterogeneity within our sample of seafood
consumers. The representativeness of the sample allows us to draw more meaningful
inference for identification of potential target groups for future information
campaigns. For this we start by dividing the data into four quantiles based on the
average information premium, the difference in WTP before and after receiving an
information intervention, for each product/information treatment combination. We
explore differences in demographic characteristics such as age and gender, along with
preferences and attitudes related to seafood products and information sources between
each of the quantiles.
Table 1.3 presents an example summary of the analysis described above for
those participants bidding on swordfish that received the FDA information treatment.
Aside from the significant t-test for ‘Benefits Greater than Risks for Pregnant Women
and Children’, there are no significant differences across the quantiles. This suggests
that there may not be sizable sources of heterogeneity among participants for this
particular combination of product and information types. The significant t-test related
to pregnant women and children is interesting however, as a majority of the
information sources target women who are pregnant or may become pregnant. As the
9

FDA information treatment focuses specifically on the risk associated with high levels
of mercury in swordfish, it seems intuitive that those that perceive the benefits to
outweigh the risks to be in the higher quantile. This pattern, or lack thereof, is
consistent for all product and information-type combinations.
A visual inspection of the data provides some further insight. In figure 1.1, box
and whisker plots of the information premium are displayed by both information
treatment and product. The first observation is that evidence of information being
effective at reducing bids for products associated with negative health effects
(swordfish) exists, but not at increasing bids for products associated with positive
health effects (salmon). This is consistent with the findings of Uchida, Roheim, and
Johnston (2017). What we add to the results of these authors is identification of the
unique characteristics of the change in bid distributions shown in figure 1.1. The
distributions of change in bid associated with the majority of the information-seafood
product pairings have mean values not significantly different from zero and exhibit
wide deviation about the mean. However, these distributions are not symmetric about
their respective means, nor about zero. We interpret these varying distributional
characteristics as evidence of sub-groups within each distribution, and thus
heterogeneous treatment effects of information. With this in mind, we further explore
these potentially heterogeneous groupings in our sample more rigorously using a finite
mixture model.
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1.3 Methodology
In this section, we develop the empirical model to be estimated. First, we briefly
review the rigors of finite mixture models (adapted from McLachlan and Peel 2000),
followed by the presentation of our specific model.
In our and other similar applications, we wish to model the heterogeneity
evidenced to exist in the data. A finite mixture model takes on this task by estimating
probability density functions for each component (or group) found within the data. In
particular, suppose we have a vector of observed value y1 ,..., y n , with y i  Y .
Assuming Y to be a continuous random vector, we have the probability density
function f (y i ) , which can be written as
K

f (y i ) =   k f k (y i )

(1)

k =1

where f k ( yi ) represents the probability density function of each of the k components
in our dependent measure. The term 𝜋𝑘 is the “mixing weight” and represents the
percentage of the population belonging to group k. Per usual probability assumptions,
𝜋𝑘 is constrained within the interval, [0,1] and must sum to unity over k. Thus,
equation (1) represents the weighted sum of k probability density functions and is thus
itself a probability density function. Initially, the k components are unknown and must
be simultaneously inferred from the data, along with mixing weights and other
parameter estimates of interest to the model.
The component densities f k ( yi ) are specified as a distinct set of parameters
𝛽𝑘 , 𝜎𝑘2 , and 𝜋𝑘 . We assume the densities to be independent and identically distributed
(iid) multivariate normal at the individual level within component k such that
11

f k (yi ; k , k2 ,  k ) =  k  f k (yi ; k , 2k ) with f k (yi ; k , 2k ) =  (yi ; k , k2 ) . The iid
assumption is necessary for our application (McLachlan and Peel 2004). The choice to
model preference heterogeneity as a mixture of multivariate normal densities is
common in the literature. We leave exploration of alternate distributional assumptions
to future work.
In estimating these models, it is common practice to employ the expectation
maximization (EM) algorithm, which maximizes the log-likelihood of the mixture
distribution in equation (1) (McLachlan and Peel 2000).2 The EM algorithm is ideal
for estimating models that involve missing or unobserved data; for more details see
Jedidi, et al. (1993). In the case of our model, the unobserved data is the component
“label” vector with observations z1 ,..., z n , which denote the component membership
for each of the observations y1 ,..., y n .
In our case, we have vectors y i containing three elements such that,

yijt = ( yi1t , yi 2t , yi 3t ) , where the second subscript j = {1,2,3} indexes the individual
seafood product that was bid on, and the third subscript t = {1,2,3,4,5,6} indexes the
information treatment received. Following Wakamatsu et al. (2017), we use the
information premium as our dependent measure and control for product and
information received. We do not explicitly control for auction round, as this is already
taken into account in our dependent measure. Thus, an element of yijt represents the
participant i’s change in bid between round 2 and round 6, i.e., information premium
for product j after receiving information treatment t.

2

Implemented in the R package flexmix (R Core Team 2016).
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We estimate a model of the following form,

InfoPremiumkijt =  k +   kij Prod j +   kit Infot +   kijt Prod j  Infot
jJ

tT

jJ tT

+U k + Vki +  kijt ,  kijt ~ N (0, ).

(2)

2
k

The dependent variable, InfoPremium, is defined as the difference in bids between
round six (post information content and source being provided) and two (prior to any
information treatment) for component k, individual i, product type j, and information
type t. We control for the product type and the information treatment received, as well
as their interaction. Our reference category is comprised of participants receiving no
information, bidding on swordfish, accounted for in the component specific constant,

 k . Terms U k and Vki are random effects at individual level, allowing correlation
within component k and within-individual i in component k, respectively. This is
necessary in our model as there are three observations per individual, which are likely
to be correlated. The random effects also force “hard” component assignment,
meaning each participant is assigned to one and only one component. The error term,

 kijt , is iid with mean zero and the variance of  k2 for a given component k.
1.4 Results
The first task is to determine the number of components, or classes, to retain in the
finite mixture model. We estimate our mixture model as specified in equation 2. We
do not include additional controls at this point, as we are interested in classifying
consumers solely based on their response to information received, i.e., information
premium.
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For determining the number of classes, we follow Biernacki, Celeux, and
Govaert (2000) where they address the potential model selection pitfalls when using
finite mixture models. Specifically, they point out that conventional criterion of largest
integrated likelihood/BIC does not account for the clustering purpose of a finite
mixture model, leading to potential overestimate of the correct class size. They instead
propose an Integrated Classification Likelihood (ICL) to address the potential
limitations of BIC; this model selection criterion is also embraced in the highly cited
Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010). As such, we chose to use BIC and ICL for
determining the number of classes. Table 1.4 provides a summary of the class-number
selection criteria for k = 1,2, 3, and 4 classes. While BIC and ICL are minimized with
k = 3 classes, the improvement in model fit gained from specifying a three-class rather
than a two-class model is much smaller than the relative improvement in fit from
specifying a two-class rather than a one-class model. It should also be noted that only
twenty-seven participants in our sample were assigned to the third class, which does
not provide sufficient explanatory power for our analyses (Wakamatsu et al. 2017;
Garrett, Eaton, and Zeger 2002). We conducted all subsequent analyses with the twoclass specification. Summary statistics for each class as well as the Rhode Island
population are included in table 1.5.
As a means of capturing preference heterogeneity, the pre-auction survey
included a number of questions related to different facets of seafood consumption:
purchase behavior, seafood lifestyle, health perceptions, and information trust.
Responses to these questions are used to capture the underlying constructs of our
samples’ prior seafood preferences using a factor analysis.
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Purchase behavior captures preference structure using the location participants
reported visiting most to purchase seafood and factors considered during seafood
purchase. Participants were asked to select the location they most often purchase
seafood from a list of nine options by marking a box. Nine purchase considerations
were measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 - “Strongly Disagree”/5- “Strongly
Agree”). Seafood lifestyle is intended to capture the strength of participants’ seafood
preferences using a six-point consumption frequency measure for eleven food
products (eight seafood products and three non-seafood), and indicators of whether
participants recreationally fish, fish for food, or work in the fishing industry. We
characterize health perceptions based on responses on a five-point Likert scale (1 “Strongly Disagree”/5- “Strongly Agree”) to statements related to the nutrition, safety,
and benefits of seafood consumption, along with perceived healthfulness of seventeen
food products (twelve seafood and five non-seafood). Lastly, information trust is
characterized by reported trust in fourteen seafood information sources measured on a
five-point Likert scale (1 – “Strongly Distrust)/5 – “Strongly Trust”).
We use principal-component factor analysis of the response correlation matrix
to reduce the number of variables within each measure to develop an informative
profile of prior preferences and perceptions of our sample. We initially retained factors
based on a threshold eigenvalue of one. However, we examine scree plots of the
associated eigenvalues to determine the final number of factors to retain as the
eigenvalue criteria often results in too many retained factors (Costello and Osborne
2005). Visual examination of the scree plot allows the researcher to identify the
relative contribution of each factor to explained sample variance. The natural bend of
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the scree plot is indicative of the number of factors to retain. The scree plots for each
of our proposed measures are presented in figure 1.2. Rotated VARIMAX loadings for
the retained factors are presented in tables 1.6-1.9 for each of the four measures.
We characterize three factors of purchase behavior we denote as well-being
conscious, specialty-store shopper, and quality conscious. The well-being conscious
characterization is based on high loadings on agreement with purchasing seafood that
is low fat, healthy, favored by one’s culture or religion, and seller recommended. The
quality conscious is based on high positive loadings on attributes of freshness, wild
caught, purchasing seafood most often at a fish market, and high negative loading on
purchasing seafood most often at a super market. Specialty-store shoppers are
distinguished by high positive loading on purchasing seafood most often at specialty
stores, e.g. Whole Foods, and a high negative loading on purchasing seafood most
often at typical super markets, such as Stop and Shop in the northeast United States.
This factor also loads high on preference for wild caught seafood.
Seafood lifestyle is characterized by four factors: surf consumer, turf
consumer, locally engaged, and self-sufficient. The first two factors have high
loadings on seafood and non-seafood consumption frequency, respectively. Factor
three is characterized by consumption frequency of cod or haddock and swordfish (all
locally caught species in Rhode Island and more broadly throughout New England)
and an indicator of participation in recreational fishing. Factor four has high loading
on recreational fishing and fish for food indicators.
Health perceptions are summarized by three factors: surf health, benefits
outweigh the risks, and turf health. Surf (turf) health is characterized by high loadings
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on healthfulness rating of (non-)seafood products. Benefits outweigh the risks factor is
characterized by high positive loadings on the perceived healthfulness and nutritious
rating of consuming seafood relative to non-seafood, low perceived risks associated
with eating seafood, and perceptions that the benefits outweigh the risks of eating
seafood.
There are five information trust factors: government trust, social influence
trust, interest group trust, media trust, and academic trust. These are characterized by
high loadings on reported trust in information provided by each group of respective
sources. For example, the interest group trust factor has high positive loadings on trust
in information provided by environmental groups and consumer groups, whereas the
media trust factor has high loadings on trust of information in the newspaper,
Wikipedia, cooking shows and television/radio. The social influence trust factor is
characterized by trust in information sources with social influence (family members,
cooking shows, local fisherman and fishing industry). The government factor is
indicative of trust in federal and state information sources, while the academic trust
factor has high loadings on trust in information from dieticians and university
published sources.
1.4.1 Class Characterization
We classify consumer types within each class based on their demographics and
seafood consumption characteristics identified in the factor analysis above, as these
are likely to influence how participants respond to information (Visschers et al. 2013;
Verbeke et al. 2008). We use a multinomial logit (MNL) to investigate factors that
characterize our classes similar to Wakamatsu et al. (2017). We regress class
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membership on demographics and all factors identified in the factor analysis above
with class one as the base case. The model is summarized in table 1.10. The predicted
factor values are standardized and have mean equal to zero and standard deviation
equal to one. So, positive (negative) values imply a high (low) rating in a factor.
Demographics are all dummy variables except age. We also conducted confirmatory
analyses using ANOVA and Tukey honest significant difference tests of the
regressors. Summaries of these analyses are available upon request.
The first notable result is demographic characteristics do not significantly
influence class membership. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g. Johnston et
al. 2001). Surprisingly, neither prior health perception factors nor classification as a
well-being conscious consumer affect class membership. Given we classify
individuals based on their response to health information, it is surprising that prior
health perceptions have no significant effect on class membership. The defining
characteristics of the two classes relate to purchase behavior, seafood lifestyle, and
trust in information sources. Specifically, specialty store shoppers and those that trust
information provided by social influences are more likely to be in class one, while
locally engaged participants and those that trust academic published seafood
information are more likely to be in class two.
1.4.2 Response to information campaigns
We now use our class-specific profiles to make inference about each class’ response to
the experimental information treatment. Table 1.11 summarizes ordinary least squares
regressions of information premium using the main specification from equation 2,
excluding the random components. We add additional interaction terms to control for
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class membership as well as other interactions of interest. Standard errors are clustered
at the individual-level to account for correlation among the bids for each seafood
product. We are interested in investigating whether controlling for the identified
heterogeneity in our sample uncovers different effects than those found by the
methods of Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017). Interestingly, we do in fact find
treatment effects not previously identified.
One key difference between the effects identified in the two classes is the
magnitude of the information premium, see figure 1.3 for a summary of average
information premium by class. Class one results exhibit effect sizes with absolute
value between one and seven dollars, while class two exhibits effect sizes between
zero and approximately one dollar. The sign of the effects is similar within each class,
which makes the magnitude distinction important as this is an indication of the
intensity of the information effect. For example, while both classes increased bids for
farmed salmon in the combined FDA/Industry treatment, class one increased their bids
by $4.98 while class two increased by $0.68. This pattern holds for other cases where
significant effects are identified in both classes.
We computed predictive margins of information premium based on the
specification above and summarized them in figure 1.4 by class. The predicted
margins provide more meaningful interpretation by summarizing the full effect of
information in the form of participants’ predicted information premium rather than a
marginal change by regression coefficients. The notable result is that only class two
has predicted information premia different from zero for all three products, while class
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one has predicted information premia different from zero for only swordfish. We
discuss each class in turn.
Class one responded significantly to information while bidding on swordfish,
the product all experimental treatments recommend avoiding. Specifically, these
participants have negative predicted information premia when provided FDA/Industry,
NAS, or University information sources. It is interesting that these participants were
responsive to the combination of FDA/Industry sources, but not the sources
individually. Both the FDA and Industry treatments tell readers to not eat swordfish
altogether, rather than a suggested quantity or frequency to consume swordfish.
Perhaps the combination of these sources reinforced avoidance of swordfish in this
group of participants. The University information treatment similarly presents
swordfish in a “Do Not Eat” column in a table format along with other species high in
mercury. The NAS treatment presented information to readers in a graphical format
but made it clear that swordfish was high in mercury, which may be harmful for one’s
health.
Class two responded in accordance with the predictions of Uchida, Roheim,
and Johnston (2017) and the policy goals of USDA and HHS; bids for the salmon
products increased and bids for swordfish decreased with information. Specifically,
predicted information premium was different from zero for both farmed and wild
salmon given the Industry information treatment. Average predicted information
premium is different from zero for farmed salmon given the FDA/Industry treatment
(10% level) and for wild salmon given the University treatment. Considering the
significant effect of the Industry information and insignificance of the FDA treatment
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for farmed salmon, we have evidence to suggest that the marginal significance of the
effect of FDA/Industry together is driven by the information provided in the Industry
source.
For swordfish, class two assigned a significantly negative information
premium to FDA/Industry (10% level), NAS, and University treatments, similar to
class one. The effectiveness of University sourced information for two of three
products is consistent with this group being more trusting of academic-sourced
seafood information.
We see consistent effectiveness of NAS and University in promoting a
negative information premium for swordfish in both consumer classes. We believe this
is in part due to the graphical summary of species by Omega-3 and mercury levels.
Swordfish is made to standout via a shading scheme that highlights its high mercury
content, while farmed and wild salmon are left blank in terms of shading (though
ranked one and two respectively in terms of Omega-3 content). As mentioned above,
the University treatment summarizes species in a table format that is separated by
suggested quantities of consumption. Class two is positively responsive to Industry
and University treatments for products that provide positive health benefits, but
negatively responsive to NAS and University for a product that is associated with
health risks. In both NAS and University, the suggestion to avoid swordfish is focal;
swordfish is shaded in the NAS information as an indicator of high mercury content
and in University swordfish is contained in a column with the large header “Do Not
Eat”.
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The Industry treatment is consistent in promoting a positive information
premium for both salmon products in class two, which also included a tabular
summary of seafood species related to Omega-3 content. In this treatment, the benefits
of omega-3s especially for pregnant and nursing women are succinctly stated. Salmon
is focal in this treatment based on its ranking as one of the top three consumed species
in the U.S. and by having more than double the omega-3 content (1,238 mg) relative
to the second highest, Canned White Tuna (535 mg).
Since the information treatments used in Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston’s
(2017) original study were targeted at women of child-bearing age, we build on the
model above by including a control for gender that equals one if a participant is
female. There is also evidence throughout the literature that men and women use
nutrition and health-related information differently (Visschers et al. 2013). We find
evidence in support of the supplementary analyses conducted by Uchida, Roheim, and
Johnston (2017), as well as additional evidence of heterogenous responses to
information by gender. In fact, we have evidence that the experimental information
treatments are effective at both promoting beneficial and deterring harmful seafood
consumption in the target population of women.
The plots in panel (a) of figure 1.5 summarize the predictive margins for
females in each class, while panel (b) summarizes the predictive margins for males.
These plots highlight the fact that female participants drive the significant information
premia identified in the specification without demographic controls in each class. This
is evidence that the information treatments are effective at 1) promoting beneficial
seafood consumption in the majority of our sample and 2) shifting consumer
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preferences in the targeted population. We discuss these results more in the context of
our specific class characterizations.
1.5 Discussion
Based on our MNL analysis, we concluded that participants in class one are more
likely to be specialty store shoppers. Shopping at specialty stores is often deemed a
symbol of social status (Samoggia and Castellini 2018). Our results are consistent with
this in the sense that consumers in class one trust sources with varying levels of social
influence, i.e. market, cooking show, family, local fisher, and industry sources.
Previous work has also noted that these types of consumers are more health conscious
and socially aware of their food purchasing behavior (Fernandes and Srinivasan 2018),
making them likely more aware of the benefits of salmon consumption. This is a
potential explanation for the ineffectiveness of information in promoting salmon
consumption for class one participants. Since we have a sample of Rhode Island
residents, we are able to make further inference about the presentation of seafood
information at specialty stores in the area and how this might relate to their
information premia.
Along with multiple Whole Foods Market locations, there are local specialty
stores that attract similar types of shoppers as Whole Foods. Reviewing information
about seafood and methylmercury on Whole Foods’ webpage reveals an understated
suggestion to avoid swordfish and other high mercury seafood, while promoting
consumption of low-mercury seafood (“Mercury in Seafood FAQ” 2019). The
webpage of a local specialty store does not give information about mercury in seafood,
but prominently displays information about salmon consumption and informs
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customers about the differences between wild and farmed salmon (“Fresh Salmon in
RI” 2019). Taking these facts together we conjecture that these consumers did not
respond positively to information about salmon due to prior preferences (and
willingness to pay) for salmon fillets that already considers the benefits of salmon
consumption.
In the context of swordfish, the information consumers are provided in-store
does not make the risks associated with swordfish as focal as the benefits of salmon.
Information on Whole Foods’ website may even (perversely) promote higher
swordfish consumption through promotion and availability of Marine Stewardship
Council certified swordfish flesh, (“Harpoon-Caught Swordfish” 2019; Johnston and
Roheim 2006; Johnston et al. 2001). Thus, being provided information that is open
and suggestive about the risks of mercury and swordfish consumption during the
auction filled the void left in the market information available at specialty stores. We
imagine stores avoid using strong language or suggestions related to the mercury
content of swordfish to avoid instilling a sense of fear about these less commonly
consumed species3.
We have identified seafood information campaigns that worked at both
increasing demand for seafood with positive health benefits in class two only and
decreasing demand for seafood that poses health risks in both classes. The consistent
conclusion is that information provided succinctly and accompanied by graphical
representations, either a table or figure, were effective at changing the preferences of
women in our sample. So, perhaps information campaigns should use a brief narrative

3

Salmon has been one of the top three seafood products consumed in the United States since at least
2007 according to the National Fisheries Institute (2018, 2017, 2015).
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accompanied by a clear graphic or tabular summary of information as a means of
improving the saliency of the seafood message (Visschers, Hess, and Siegrist 2010).
This is already a common practice in seafood information campaigns, for example the
Monterey Bay Aquarium Seafood Watch information cards. Since women are the
target population of these information, it is encouraging that we identify an
information presentation that consistently promotes consumption of seafood that
provides health benefits and deters consumption of seafood that poses potential health
risks.
If information campaigns can be developed and created to target this important
subpopulation, perhaps they would be more effective in promoting aggregate
consumption of seafood. Our results, accounting for sample aggregation effects,
provide evidence that is consistent with conjectures posed by Uchida, Roheim, and
Johnston (2017). Specifically, we recommend incorporating aspects of the campaigns
that were effective at promoting beneficial seafood consumption (Industry, NAS and
University) as a foundation for future health information campaigns.
Should policymakers choose to pursue a targeted information campaign
incorporating the information presentation format of the effective campaigns
mentioned above, we suggest using information that is published or supported by
academics. We base this on the fact that the majority of our sample is characterized by
its trust in academic-sourced seafood information and significant response to
information promoting seafood that provide health benefits and discouraging seafood
that poses health risks. These consumers would be the most cost-effective and
efficiently targeted group, particularly with information campaigns supported and
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published by academic researchers. This information would at a minimum discourage
consumption of seafood that is high in methylmercury content across consumer
segments. We do see potential challenges to fully implementing such a policy given
the recent decrease in the public’s trust in science (Pew Research Center 2016) and the
ambiguous or inaccurate health-related information shared and promoted by socially
influential public figures, such as a number of celebrities promoting the (unsupported)
link between vaccinations and autism in children.
Even with these potential hurdles, our results provide a starting point for future
work and policies that develop targeted health campaigns to convey the benefits of
seafood consumption, with more focus on improving information exposure (Abroms
and Maibach 2008; Hornik 2002). There is much focus on development and dispersion
of health campaigns, but whether this information is implemented such that target
audiences are actually exposed to the information is another question. It is a step in the
right direction to refine the presentation of health information to consumers but is for
not if the information never reaches its intended audience.
1.6 Conclusion
Using data from a seafood auction experiment conducted by Uchida, Roheim, and
Johnston (2017), we gain further insight related to the heterogeneity of participants
and their responses to seafood benefit/risk information. We identify two distinct
groups of consumers characterized primarily by their preferred seafood shopping
locations and trust in sources of seafood information. The majority of our sample
trusts seafood information provided by academic researchers and/or dieticians and
were receptive to sources of information that promoted beneficial seafood
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consumption as evidenced by positive and significant information premium for these
product/information combinations. The remaining portion of our sample is
characterized by a preference to shop for seafood at specialty grocery stores, like
Whole Foods Markets. These participants were primarily receptive to information
associated with the risk of swordfish consumption. The significant effects were driven
primarily by females in each of our consumer segments, which is encouraging given
the context of the original study conducted by Uchida, Roheim, and Johnston (2017).
Even with ever-developing marketing methods, a large gap still exists in research on
seafood information campaigns, and other food products in general, regarding how to
effectively communicate health benefits in a way that increases demand. Based on
these results, we recommend design of targeted information campaigns that provide
information in succinct, graphical representations with particular focus on
implementation that optimizes information exposure, a recommendation put forth by
Nesheim and Yaktine (2007). Given the advantages associated with the modern
marketing environment (see Iyer et al. 2005 for a theoretical discussion of this), it is
imperative to have available a feasible mechanism to increase information exposure
and promote healthy food consumption to enhance positive health outcomes in U.S.
consumers. This is particularly important in low-income and other consumer segments
with high risk of diet related health issues. Our results are encouraging with regard to
identifying consumer segments responsive to benefit-focused health information and
presents an opportunity for these results to play their own part in the comprehensive
effort by academics and policymakers alike to improve public health.
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Table 1.1 Sample descriptive statistics
Variable
Age (years)
Female (%)
Education (%)
Less than High School
High school or GED
Some college, no degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional degree
Income (%)
Less than $25,000
$25,000 - 49,999
$50,000 - 99,999
$100,000 - 149,999
$150,000 or more
Household Size (%)
Households with one or more people
under 18 years (%)
Change in bid between rounds 2 and 6 ($)
Wild Salmon
Farmed Salmon
Swordfish
N

Whole Sample
38.23
58.7

Rhode Island
40.2
52.2

1.2
19.5
21.2
18.9
26.0
12.7

11.4
27.8
18.4
8.2
20.6
13.5

26.0
28.9
32.4
10.0
1.2
2.91

22.1
21.2
28.6
16.4
11.7
2.48

37.5

27.4

0.09
0.04
-0.68
339

-

Notes: Education for Rhode Island population reported for those aged 25 years of age or
older. Percent female is for those aged 18 years of ag or older in all columns. Summary of
state-level statistics obtained from the most recent American Community Survey estimates
(United States Census Bureau 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
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Table 1.2 Summary of experimental information treatments
Information
treatment
FDA
Industry
FDA/Industry

Frequency
56
57
59

Type
Risk
Benefit
Balanced

University

52

Balanced(R)

NAS
No Information
Total

64
52
340

Balanced(B)
-

Salmon
No
Yes
Yes
Wild and
Farmed
Wild and
Farmed
-

Swordfish
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
-

Notes: Adapted from Uchida et al (2017). Balanced (B) denotes a balanced treatment with a
slight focus on benefits, Balanced (R) denotes a balanced treatment with slight focus on
risks.
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Table 1.3 Summary of information premium by quantile
Item

Bottom 5%

5%-50% 50%-95%
95 % CI = [-0.78, 0.29]

37

Change in bid between rounds 2 and 6
Age
Gender
Prefer Wild to Farmed a
Benefits Greater than Risks a

µ=2.20***
40.7
0.72
3.79
3.82

µ = -0.24
42.4
33.3
0.43
0.53
3.20
3.00
4.57
4.0

Benefits Greater than Risks for Pregnant
Women and Children a
Observations

3.19**
n = 18

3.25
n =7

2.27
n = 17

Top 5%
µ=
2.06
41.4
0.57
3.38
3.86
4.08
n = 14

Notes: The quantiles are determined using a 95% confidence interval about the mean change in bid between rounds
2 and 6 for the rounds participants were bidding on swordfish after receiving the FDA information treatment. Both
the confidence interval and mean change in bid are reported above. All reported values are means of the
corresponding item within the particular quantile. ** and *** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% and 1%
level, respectively, of t-test for equality of means between Top and Bottom 5%.
a
Measured on 5-point Likert scale

Table 1.4 Model Selection Summary
Number of Components
1
2
3
4

Iterations
2
21
51
69

Note: Preferred model is in boldface type.

Converged
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE

log Likelihood
-2702
-2164
-2017
-1978

BIC
5535
4599
4444
4503

ICL
5535
4622
4492
4556
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Table 1.5 Sample descriptive statistics by class

Age (years)
Female (%)
Education (%)
Less than High School
High school or GED
Some college, no degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor's
Graduate or professional degree
Income (%)
Less than $25,000
$25,000 - 49,999
$50,000 - 99,999
$100,000 - 149,999
$150,000 or more
Household Size
Households with one or more people under
18 years (%)
Change in bid between rounds 2 and 6 ($)
Wild Salmon
Farmed Salmon
Swordfish
N

39

Class 1
38.70
(1.50)
65.06
(5.27)

Class 2
38.10
(0.80)
56.64
(3.10)

Rhode
Island
40.2
52.2
-

1.20
14.50
24.10
24.10
26.50
9.60

1.20
21.30
20.50
17.30
26.00
13.80

11.4
27.8
18.4
8.2
20.6
13.5

20.00
30.00
33.80
12.50
3.80
2.90
(0.20)

28.00
29.10
32.70
9.40
0.80
2.90
(0.10)

22.1
21.2
28.6
16.4
11.7
2.5

36.10
(5.30)

39.20
(3.10)

27.4

-0.10
-0.30
-1.80

0.10
0.20
-0.30

-

83

255

Table 1.6 Rotated factor loadings – seafood purchase behavior
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Variable
Primary seafood purchase location
Super Market
Specialty grocery store
Warehouse retailers
Fish Markets
Direct from fisherman
Farmers' markets
Online shopping or direct order
Catch seafood
"I tend to buy seafood products that…"
I like the taste of best
Are from the U.S.
Are wild caught
Have low fat content
Are healthy for me
Are favored by my culture or religion
Are recommended by the fish seller
Note: Factor loadings greater than 0.4 in bold

Factor 1
Well-being
conscious

Factor 2
Quality
conscious

Factor 3
Specialty
store shopper

0.0053
0.0679
-0.1582
-0.0503
0.2388
0.1179
0.0165
0.0133

-0.3192
-0.2209
-0.1048
0.6446
0.212
-0.0629
-0.3122
0.6638

-0.8117
0.8506
0.1827
0.0028
-0.1065
-0.0003
0.1194
0.0249

-0.0106
0.2619
0.3464
0.746
0.7127
0.6048
0.4871

0.4667
0.4467
0.3843
0.0779
-0.0064
-0.0457
-0.0883

0.0765
0.2009
0.4483
0.0658
0.0022
0.0446
0.1928

Table 1.7 Rotated factor loadings – seafood lifestyle
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Variable
Frequency of
consumption
Salmon
Swordfish
Tuna
Tilapia
Catfish
Shrimp
Cod or haddock
Other seafood
Chicken
Beef
Pork
Recreational fisher
Fishes for food
Fishing industry worker

Factor 1
Surf

Factor 2
Turf

Factor 3
Locally engaged

Factor 4
Self-sufficient

0.5633
0.0492
0.545
0.7364
0.5758
0.5055
0.2023
0.3955
-0.079
0.1057
0.0052
-0.139
0.0891
-0.21

0.2173
0.0738
-0.138
0.1268
-0.018
-0.138
-0.064
-0.203
0.7168
0.8192
0.768
-0.168
0.0231
0.1279

0.1401
0.8416
0.1282
-0.0902
0.1792
0.3262
0.5729
0.3481
0.0817
0.0389
-0.1067
0.4555
-0.1319
0.1206

-0.073
-0.078
-0.1936
0.0496
0.1644
0.1214
-0.0609
0.2927
0.2204
-0.009
-0.1824
0.5091
0.8203
0.3091

Note: Factor loadings greater than 0.4 in bold

Table 1.8 Rotated factor loadings – seafood health perceptions
Factor1
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Variable
Health perceptions
Seafood is nutritious
Seafood is safe to eat
The health benefits from eating seafood are
greater than the health risks for most people
The health benefits of eating seafood are
greater than the health risks for pregnant
woman and children
Wild seafood is better for my health than
farmed seafood
The health risks of eating seafood are small
Seafood is healthier to eat than beef
Seafood is healthier to eat than poultry
Health rating
Farmed Salmon
Wild Salmon
Swordfish
Tuna (fresh)
Bluefish
Cod / Haddock
Herring
Canned tuna

Seafood health

Factor2
Benefits outweigh
the risks

Factor3
Turf health

0.079
0.0281

0.5045
0.667

0.1606
0.0751

0.1933

0.5805

-0.2303

-0.0467

0.3267

-0.1083

-0.1898
0.0564
0.2004
0.1445

0.5815
0.5648
0.6458
0.6273

0.2184
-0.018
-0.3182
-0.1946

0.6225
0.1675
0.505
0.1792
0.6862
0.4056
0.5824
0.1945

-0.0162
0.5961
0.1285
0.2869
0.1651
0.1789
0.077
0.2131

0.0021
0.2468
0.1727
0.2541
-0.0123
0.2204
0.0695
0.3397

Table 1.8 (continued) Rotated factor loadings – seafood health perceptions
Wild Oysters
Farmed Oysters
Farmed Shrimp
Wild Shrimp
Ground Beef (90% lean or more)
Chicken (white meat)
Eggs
Pork Chops
Beef Steak (Sirloin)
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Note: Factor loadings greater than 0.4 in bold

0.6165
0.7614
0.7132
0.4782
0.0096
0.2675
0.119
0.0993
0.07

0.2424
-0.0286
0.0528
0.388
-0.0784
0.0672
0.0752
-0.0146
-0.0542

0.1548
0.1044
0.0107
0.1532
0.7712
0.5344
0.614
0.5913
0.7293

Table 1.9 Rotated factor loadings – seafood information trust
Factor 1
Variable
Newspapers, magazines, books
Wikipedia or similar websites
Dieticians, nutritionists,
physicians
Federal government
State government
Supermarkets or seafood
markets
Family and friends
Cooking shows
Television or radio news
University scientists
Environmental groups
Consumer groups
Local fishermen
The seafood industry

Factor 3
Interest
Group
-0.0198
0.057

Factor 4

Factor 5

Government
0.1452
0.1377

Factor 2
Social
Influence
0.0196
0.0433

Media
0.712
0.7362

Academic
0.1934
-0.0096

0.1858
0.9312
0.9219

0.1405
0.0379
0.0488

-0.0679
0.1076
0.135

0.0773
0.0751
0.0976

0.8572
0.1065
0.0887

0.4751
-0.1796
-0.0234
0.1686
0.0684
0.1132
0.2251
-0.0619
0.412

0.583
0.5994
0.4623
0.0831
-0.0881
0.0982
0.2176
0.7065
0.6818

0.0033
0.035
0.1616
0.4382
0.507
0.8432
0.7682
0.2432
0.1684

0.1408
0.1297
0.5134
0.5787
0.1065
0.042
0.089
-0.0194
0.0456

0.0869
0.2163
0.1877
0.048
0.6672
0.0898
-0.0447
0.0602
-0.0546

Note: Factor loadings greater than 0.4 in bold
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Table 1.10 Multinomial logit summary
Trust Academics
(Specialty Store base)

VARIABLES
Age (years)
Female (=1 if female)
College (=1 if earned at least associate's degree)
Income greater than $50,000 (=1 if pre-tax
household income is greater than $50,000)
Child (=1 if at least one member of household
under 18 years of age)
Purchase behavior factors
Well-being conscious

0.0156
(0.0176)
-0.194
(0.423)
-0.184
(0.440)
-0.606
(0.447)
0.359
(0.416)
-0.114
(0.197)
-0.326
(0.205)
-0.516**
(0.210)

Quality conscious
Specialty store
Seafood lifestyle factors
Surf

-0.0186
(0.229)
-0.0477
(0.207)
0.795***
(0.234)
0.113
(0.234)

Turf
Locally engaged
Self-sufficient
Health perception factors
Surf health

-0.0840
(0.211)
-0.232
(0.236)
-0.0937
(0.226)

Benefits outweigh the risks
Turf health
Information trust factors
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Government

0.251
(0.251)
-0.529**
(0.249)
0.201
(0.225)
-0.247
(0.198)
0.385*
(0.218)
1.039
(0.778)

Social influence
Interest group
Media
Academic
Constant

Chi-square (d.f.)
Pseudo R-squared

29.34 (20)
0.155

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11 Effect of information on information premium by class
VARIABLES

(1)

Farmed

(2)

-2.498
1.003
(1.976)
(2.135)
-1.148
1.003
(1.517)
(1.766)
-1.400 7.681***
(2.994)
(2.766)
-1.566
6.387**
(3.209)
(2.608)
-3.826
0.587
(2.974)
(2.951)
-3.635
4.789
(3.083)
(2.999)
-4.092
1.977
(3.045)
(3.673)
3.725*
-0.621
(2.142)
(2.476)
1.533
1.362
(2.214)
(2.326)
4.894**
5.249*
(2.382)
(2.727)
6.903***
2.312
(2.274)
(2.618)
5.047**
2.445
(2.174)
(2.524)
4.820
5.223
(3.229)
(6.418)
2.658
-0.131
(2.566)
(1.885)
3.480
2.499
(2.120)
(2.785)
3.257*
0.104
(1.798)
(2.361)
2.591
-1.193
(1.926)
(3.029)

Wild
FDA
Industry
FDA/Industry
NAS
University
Farmed x FDA
Farmed x Industry
Farmed x FDA/Industry
Farmed x NAS
Farmed x University
Wild x FDA
Wild x Industry
Wild x FDA/Industry
Wild x NAS
Wild x University
Class Interactions
Trust Academics (=1)

-0.828
(2.754)
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6.593***
(2.230)

Table 1.11 (continued) Effect of information on information premium by class
Farmed x Trust Academics
Wild x Trust Academics
FDA x Trust Academics
Industry x Trust Academics
FDA/Industry x Trust Academics
NAS x Trust Academics
University x Trust Academics
Farmed x FDA x Trust Academics
Farmed x Industry x Trust Academics
Farmed x FDA/Industry x Trust Academics
Farmed x NAS x Trust Academics
Farmed x University x Trust Academics
Wild x FDA x Trust Academics
Wild x Industry x Trust Academics
Wild x FDA/Industry x Trust Academics
Wild x NAS x Trust Academics
Wild x University x Trust Academics
Female Interactions
Female (=1)

2.381
(1.984)
1.072
(1.528)
1.272
(3.002)
1.226
(3.222)
3.553
(2.982)
3.049
(3.091)
3.668
(3.057)
-3.411
(2.155)
-0.708
(2.232)
-4.214*
(2.394)
-6.056***
(2.292)
-4.132*
(2.199)
-4.580
(3.238)
-1.647
(2.588)
-2.916
(2.134)
-2.763
(1.817)
-1.630
(1.950)

-1.217
(2.157)
-1.341
(1.790)
-8.059***
(2.787)
-6.804**
(2.640)
-1.384
(2.979)
-5.648*
(3.019)
-2.455
(3.694)
1.067
(2.510)
-0.731
(2.362)
-4.191
(2.755)
-1.341
(2.647)
-2.007
(2.573)
-4.448
(6.431)
1.203
(1.936)
-1.598
(2.809)
0.727
(2.393)
1.985
(3.063)
10.19***
(3.899)
-5.002
(3.292)

Farmed x Female
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Table 1.11 (continued) Effect of information on information premium by class
Wild x Female

-3.073
(2.642)
-13.76***
(4.461)
-11.28**
(4.683)
-6.382
(4.536)
-12.42***
(4.790)
-8.460*
(4.999)
6.552*
(3.675)
0.562
(3.605)
-0.397
(3.995)
6.884*
(3.962)
3.541
(3.753)
-1.609
(6.721)
3.923
(3.906)
1.435
(3.907)
4.803
(3.301)
5.727
(3.764)
-10.59***
(3.915)
5.137
(3.313)
3.440
(2.669)

FDA x Female
Industry x Female
FDA/Industry x Female
NAS x Female
University x Female
Farmed x FDA x Female
Farmed x Industry x Female
Farmed x FDA/Industry x Female
Farmed x NAS x Female
Farmed x University x Female
Wild x FDA x Female
Wild x Industry x Female
Wild x FDA/Industry x Female
Wild x NAS x Female
Wild x University x Female
Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x Trust Academics x Female
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Table 1.11 (continued) Effect of information on information premium by class
FDA x Trust Academics x Female
Industry x Trust Academics x Female
FDA/Industry x Trust Academics x Female
NAS x Trust Academics x Female
University x Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x FDA x Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x Industry x Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x FDA/Industry x Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x NAS x Trust Academics x Female
Farmed x University x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x FDA x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x Industry x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x FDA/Industry x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x NAS x Trust Academics x Female
Wild x University x Trust Academics x Female
Constant

0.799
(2.750)
1,017
0.031

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

14.10***
(4.485)
11.29**
(4.721)
7.239
(4.562)
12.79***
(4.814)
8.431*
(5.029)
-6.746*
(3.710)
-0.154
(3.650)
-0.278
(4.025)
-7.074*
(4.008)
-2.609
(3.810)
0.787
(6.740)
-3.915
(3.963)
-1.946
(3.937)
-5.324
(3.344)
-5.294
(3.813)
-6.337***
(2.210)
1,017
0.071

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual-level (n = 338) are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.1 Summary of information premium by product and information treatment
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Note: Boxes in red have mean change in bid significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
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5

Figure 1.2 Scree plots for prior seafood consumption profile factors
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Note: The x-and y-axis denote number of factors and eigenvalues, respectively. The horizontal line
indicates the typical cut-off used to determine the number of retained factors.
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Figure 1.3 Quantile plot of information premium by class
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Figure 1.4 Margins plot by class for information-product combination
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Figure 1.5 Margins plot by class, by gender
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Abstract
Recently, the aquaculture industry has expanded to meet growing global seafood
demand through increased investment and technological innovations; one of which
being the development of genetically modified (GM) fish. Under the recently signed
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, foods containing any of the
commercially available GM foods will require mandatory disclosure. Considering
these developments, we investigate consumer preferences for GM seafood using an
online choice experiment to determine willingness to pay for Atlantic Salmon fillets
with labels denoting the presence or absence of GM technology. We find participants
are willing to pay a premium for fillets that are labeled as Verified Non-GM, Organic,
or Fed-GM, and require a discount for fillets labeled GM. Our results confirm
previous conjectures that information about biotechnology has a polarizing effect on
demand. We highlight the marketing challenges faced by producers of GM seafood
and opportunities for improved science communication about novel food technologies.
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2.1 Introduction
Annual global per capita seafood consumption has more than doubled since the 1960s
to over 20 kg, making up over 16 percent of global animal protein intake and more
than 6 percent of all protein consumed (FAO 2016). However, global harvest of wild
fish has remained almost constant since the 1990s. Meanwhile, the aquaculture
industry expanded rapidly to fill the gap and meet global seafood demand (FAO
2016), and this trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable future. This will
encourage and attract more investment and technological innovations in aquaculture
sector; particularly the development of genetically-modified (GM) fish that grows
faster, meatier, disease tolerant, etc. Looking at the experience of the agriculture
industry in adoption of GM technologies, it is only a matter of time before the U.S.
consumers and seafood supply chain are faced with decisions involving GM seafood.
The question is whether the market will accept GM seafood, and will it advance the
contribution of aquaculture in meeting the world seafood demand.
In an attempt to explore the possibilities of using GM technologies in
aquaculture, the Canadian government approved legislation in 1989 that allowed
production of GM Atlantic Salmon in research facilities. This would spark a group of
researchers to form what is today AquaBounty Technologies, Inc. located in
Massachusetts and Prince Edward Island. These researchers developed a GM Atlantic
Salmon, marketed as AquAdvantage Salmon©, which grows to market weight twice as
quickly as conventionally farmed salmon. AquAdvantage Salmon© has been sold in
Argentina, Brazil and Canada and approved for sale in the U.S. in 2015. However, the
controversy surrounding AquAdvantage Salmon© among aquaculture and fishery
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stakeholders (Smith et al. 2010) has halted it reaching the market until a clear labeling
standard is put in place.
On July 29, 2016 the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard
(NBFDS) was signed into law (Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291296 2016). The first iteration of the standard was available for public comment on
May 3, 2018. As it currently stands, foods containing any of the commercially
available GM foods and their derivatives will be subject to disclosure, while small
food manufacturers, restaurants, animals fed with GM products, and foods certified
under the National Organic Program are exempt (Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946,
7 U.S.C. §§ 291-296 2016). Disclosure is proposed to be carried out via written text, a
symbol similar to the USDA Organic symbol, or electronically using QR codes, for
example. The NBFDS was finalized in December 2018 and is set to be fully
implemented on January 1, 2020 (Boudreau 2018).
Given this definition, there are a variety of seafood products that will be
subject to disclosure. Processed seafood where Non-GM fish is combined with GM
plant-based ingredients, e.g. surimi, is one example. Surimi is often used as imitation
crab meat and made from minced white fish fillets such as pollock and ingredients
made from sugar, vegetable oils, corn starch, and soy-based protein. Over 90% of the
plant -based ingredients in surimi that are produced in the U.S. come from GM plant
varieties and would require disclosure under the NBFDS (International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 2018; USDA ERS 2017). Another example
is farmed fish, like Atlantic salmon, that are fed fish meal containing GM plant-based
ingredients (Naylor et al. 2009).
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For companies in the seafood industry, and food producers in general, the final
labeling standard is projected to have significant and negative economic impacts
(Bovay and Alston 2018). In anticipation of these impacts, some companies are taking
proactive steps before implementation of the NBFDS. For example, Washington-based
seafood supplier Trans-Ocean Products, Inc. obtained a Non-GM certification for its
Simply Surimi brand by Non-GMO Project, one of the leading programs of this kind
in an effort to combat any confusion among consumers once the final standard is set
(Kearns 2017). While not all seafood companies will go as far as Trans-Ocean
Products, one can reasonably expect that seafood suppliers will be making business
decisions, if not already, in response to the new GM labeling standard.
In this paper, we investigate consumer preferences using a discrete choice
experiment where participants make choices between fresh Atlantic Salmon fillets
with labels denoting the presence or absence of GM technology and test the impact of
additional market information on demand for labeled products. We find participants
are willing to pay a significantly higher premium for Verified Non-GM salmon fillets
than Organic fillets. Interestingly and in opposition to previous findings, participants
are willing to pay a premium for fillets from a Fed-GM salmon. We associate this
result with the definition provided within the discrete choice experiment (DCE) for
this attribute. Regarding the provision of additional market information alongside GM
labels, we confirm previous findings that information about biotechnology in food
production processes has a relatively uniform, polarizing effect on consumer demand.
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2.2. Background
Since the first availability of GM foods in the U.S. nearly twenty-five years ago, much
academic work has been dedicated to understanding consumer perceptions and
acceptance of GM technology in food products to investigate future adoption
possibilities and uncover gaps in public understanding. On average, economics
literature has shown evidence that consumers are generally averse to GM food
products (Lusk, McFadden, and Wilson 2018; Hess et al. 2016; Dannenberg 2009;
Lusk et al. 2005), though aversion is mediated by information about tangible benefits
to consumers, such as increased nutrient content (Lusk, McFadden, and Rickard 2015;
Lusk et al. 2004; Colson, Huffman, and Rousu 2011; Grunert et al. 2001) and positive
reasons for the use of GM technology like environmental benefits or improved food
security (Lusk et al. 2004; Hossain et al. 2003; Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003;
Grunert et al. 2001).
Much of the skepticism about the use of GM technology is attributed to
unknown environmental and health consequences of production and consumption of
GM products. The most prevalent issues in discussions being unanticipated allergic
responses, spread of pest resistance or herbicide tolerance to wild plants, and
inadvertent harm to wildlife (Curtis, McCluskey, and Wahl 2004). Aside from the
tangible risks often associated with GM products, other studies have shown moral
acceptability to be a significant predictor for the encouragement of biotechnology
applications (Amin et al. 2014; Gaskell et al. 2004).
Other authors argue that it is not simply a lack of knowledge about the
consequences of GM technology, but also the demand to know, i.e. demand for
information, that drives the “dread of Genetically Modified (GM) food” (Costa-Font
60

and Mossialos 2005). While this seems credible, some authors have found evidence of
a “red flag effect” induced by labeling, in which consumers are more averse to GM
foods that require a label (Lusk and Rozan 2008). However, recent findings by
Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018) support the information demand argument by identifying
a 19% decrease in opposition to GM foods in Vermont following the passing of its
mandatory GM labeling law, which has since been preempted by the NBFDS. While
this is promising leading up to the final NBDFS, it is clear there are mixed findings in
the literature.
While there is a large body of work dedicated to consumer preferences for GM
foods, the majority of previous studies focus on products from the agriculture sector
(e.g. apples and beefsteak) with very few focused on seafood (Rickertsen, Gustavsen,
and Nayga Jr. 2017; Chern 2006; Chern et al. 2002; Kaneko and Chern 2005; Grunert
et al. 2001; Kuznesof and Ritson 1996). When the NBFDS takes effect, consumers
will be faced with the choice of (knowingly) buying GM seafood for the first time in
history, whether it is a GM species (salmon) or processed product containing GM
ingredients (canned salmon). U.S. consumers purchase a variety of foods that derive
from GM agricultural products, either in whole form or through derivative ingredients
like sugars, soy bean oil, or corn syrup. However, the time when GM foods were
introduced to the market is very different from today’s market environment;
consumers are more aware and relatively concerned about GM food (Lusk, McFadden,
and Wilson 2018). Thus, further work is needed to understand consumer attitudes and
reaction to the soon to be transparent GM seafood market in the context of the
NBFDS.
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The seafood industry is no stranger of GM technology. One of the primary
criticisms against the aquaculture industry is feed inefficiency of carnivorous species
where, for example, two tons of fish are required for feed to produce one ton of
salmon. The fish used as feed are generally wild harvest species, which adds to the
criticisms of feed inefficiency given the dim state of world fisheries (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2016). The industry’s solution was to
increase the use of fish feed containing soybean derivatives as protein substitutes,
which are primarily GM strains (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations 2016; Naylor et al. 2009; Tacon and Metian 2008). Another use of plant-based
ingredients in seafood is processed seafood products like surimi, as mentioned above,
and products like smoked oysters or smoked salmon which are often canned and
stored with soybean or cottonseed oil and likely derived from GM strains given the
extensive use of GM crops in U.S. agriculture.
GM foods have never required a label disclosing production technologies or
methods since their introduction, nor has GM seafood been on consumers’ radars aside
from news about AquAdvantage Salmon©. Given the uncertainty among consumers,
scientists, and other stakeholders regarding potential long-term impacts of GM
technology, GM food labels will act as a quality label for consumers. Generally, the
introduction of quality labels can improve social welfare for the majority of
consumers, though there are potentially large subpopulations that may be impacted
negatively by the introduction of such labels (Bonroy and Constantatos 2014).
However, there is a large gap in understanding the potentially unique effects of the
NBFDS on consumer seafood demand. This is problematic for companies interested in
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strategizing their marketing campaigns to combat the impacts from the GM labeling
law. Gaining further understanding of the consequences, both intended and
unintended, of the forthcoming NBFDS on consumer demand has important
implications regarding the extent the seafood industry should invest in the use of GM
technology and for the future of production technology labels in the seafood market,
which has never been associated with the use of genetic modification until recent
years.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample Characteristics
We recruited 1,041 online survey participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (denoted
“Mturk”). Mturk workers with greater than zero approved tasks, task approval rating
greater than 97%, and located in the United States saw the survey announcement for a
“20-minute Academic Study”. The full announcement described the study as follows:
We are currently recruiting participants to complete an academic survey about
seafood consumption. To participate, you must have at least a 97% approval
rate, live in the United States, be at least 18 years old, and meet our screening
standards. Given you meet the screening standards, you will receive $2.00 for
completing this survey which takes about 20 minutes.
Participants were asked to answer a screener questionnaire to confirm eligibility prior
to gaining access to the full the survey. Eligible participants were 1) aged 18 years or
older, 2) lived in the United States, 3) consumed seafood regularly, and 4) consumed
salmon. We paid participants $2.00 upon completion of the survey.
Using an online approach allows us to more closely mimic the familiar market
settings in which the seller posts the product price and consumers choose whether to
purchase (Alfnes et al. 2006), in contrast to in-person experiments like a second-price
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sealed bid auction. Most importantly, this survey methodology allows us to efficiently
collect quality data from multiple geographic regions to allow for broad inference
about consumer attitudes toward GM seafood and implications for the seafood market
under the NBFDS.
Our final sample consists of a diverse group of respondents from every state in
the United States aside from Delaware, table 2.1 provides sample summary statistics.
Compared to the most recent American Community Survey (United States Census
Bureau 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), our sample differs from the general population of the
United States primarily in gender distribution (40.1% female compared to 50.8% in
the ACS) and educational attainment (60% with Bachelor’s degree or higher compared
to 31.2% in the ACS). The fact that our Mturk sample is more representative than
most college student samples, internet survey panels, or in-person convenience
samples is not a surprise as this has been observed many times in other studies using
Mturk as a survey platform. While this sample is not a generally representative sample
of the United States population given previously identified nuances of the Mturk
worker population (Goodman and Paolacci 2017), we are confident in saying our
sample is sufficiently representative of U.S. seafood consumers given our screening
criteria.
2.3.2 DCE and Survey Design
We designed a DCE to simulate seafood purchase scenarios for fresh farmed Atlantic
Salmon fillets and canned farmed Atlantic Salmon with different labels denoting
presence or absence of genetic modification, country of origin, and price. The survey
instrument also asked respondents questions about their food consumption habits,
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general attitudes toward food and technology, and specific attitudes toward GM foods.
Table 2.2 summarizes the levels of each product attribute used in our DCE which were
chosen based on previous literature and current market conditions. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four information treatment groups related to GM
technology in food production: positive, negative, balanced, control. The positive
(negative) information groups received information generally supportive
(disapproving) of GM technology. The balanced treatment is a combination of both
the positive and negative information treatments. The control group received no
further information.
We used a full factorial design with each respondent answering a total of six
salmon fillet choices. Due to the large number of total choices (4 x 5 x 3 = 60 total
combinations for salmon) we blocked our choice sets to reduce the cognitive burden
on our participants. The design was created in STATA version 13 with the userwritten program dcreate, which implements an algorithm to maximize D-efficiency
of a given experimental design4 (StataCorp 2013; Hole 2015). Each respondent was
randomly assigned to one choice set block. Each choice question had two choice
alternatives plus a no purchase option. The order of each question in a given block was
randomized for each participant. Figure 2.1 is an example fillet choice set.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Conceptual Framework

4

Assuming naïve priors and including an alternative specific constant for the opt-out alternative, our
design has a D-error of 0.237 assuming only a main effects model. Assuming an interaction effect
between the GM label and country of origin our design has a D-error of 0.484.
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We use a random utility framework for analysis of our choice experiment data. Thus,
we assume individual i makes choices between J alternatives under T choice situations
by considering all alternatives offered in a choice situation and chooses the alternative
with the highest utility. The indirect utility associated with alternative j for individual i
in choice situation t is characterized by

Uijt = Vijt +  ijt ,
where Vijt = βi ' xijt is the deterministic portion of utility with individual parameter
vector β i assumed to be drawn from a population distribution, g (β | θ) where θ is the
population parameter for the distribution, and the error term,  ijt , is independent and
identically distributed extreme value type-1. Since our data have a panel structure in
that each participant answered six choice questions for each product, we need to
account for correlation between choices. As discussed in (Train 2009) , the probability
individual i chooses choice sequence si = {si1 , si 2 ,..., sT } given choice profiles

xi = {xi1, xi 2 ,..., xT } is written as the integral,
Pr( si | xi , θ) =  Pr( si | xi , βi )g (β | θ)dβ ,
β

which must be evaluated numerically using maximum-likelihood methods. We
simulate log-likelihood using 200 Halton draws in NLOGIT version 5.0 (Greene
2012), which has been shown to be sufficiently large for this type of estimation
procedure (Campbell, Hutchinson, and Scarpa 2007). Individual-level regression
coefficients for willingness-to-pay derivation are derived from sampling populationlevel parameter distributions conditional on observed choice patterns using the method
proposed by Revelt and Train (2000).
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2.4.2 Empirical specification
We control for alternative specific attributes (price, country of origin, and GM label)
for each model of product choice. Price is specified as a continuous variable while the
other alternative specific attributes are specified as dummy variables with the United
States and No Label being the reference category. Participants were provided an
information treatment related to GM technology, we interact dummy variables that
denote treatment group with GM label dummy variables to investigate whether
information influences choices for different levels of GM technology. The no
information group is the reference category. We also include an alternative specific
constant which to account for the no purchase option.
All coefficients are assumed to be normally distributed to account for
unobserved individual heterogeneity, the primary advantage of the mixed logit model
(Hensher and Greene 2003). We specify the random parameters associated with each
choice attribute to be correlated to account for systematic, but unobserved, effects of
common attributes across the choice alternatives (loc. cit.). While previous works have
assumed log-normal or triangular distributions for price coefficients to guarantee a
negative coefficient, and thus theoretically consistent, we wished to avoid imposing
such a restriction and opted for use of a normal distribution. Even without imposing
this restriction, the price parameter of our preferred model is negative giving us
confidence that our sample considered price in a theoretically consistent manner. We
did estimate models assuming price coefficients to be distributed triangular and lognormal, all of which had qualitatively similar results to the model presented herein.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Food Purchase Preferences
Prior to seeing any choice scenarios, participants were asked a suite of questions
related to food purchase behavior and preferences/perceptions of GM
food/technology. The majority of our sample (69%) “Often” or “Always” read food
labels when purchasing a new product. Between 50-60% of our sample believe it is
either “Very Important” or “Extremely Important” to label each of Organic, Non-GM,
Contains GM ingredients, GM-fed, and GM food products (table 2.3). This aligns with
the general sentiment of consumer “right to know” and use of information regarding
food production methods identified in various academic work as well as independent
polls. For example, a Pew Research Center poll (2016) found that 89% of respondents
(n = 1,480) believe the general public should play at least a minor role in making
policy decisions related to GM foods, while 40% of respondents believe the news
media does not take the health risks of GM foods seriously enough. We also asked
participants to rank four food labels in terms of likelihood of purchasing a product
with each label (table 2.4).
Unsurprisingly, participants ranked Organic as most likely to be purchased,
followed by Certified Non-GMO, Contains GM ingredients, and Produced with
Genetic Engineering. We did allow participants to rank multiple labels equally to
indicate indifference. There is a clear association made between Organic and Certified
Non-GMO labels as well as Contains GM Ingredients and Produced with Genetic
Engineering labels as evidenced by their relative average ranks by our sample.
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Participants were also asked if they preferred to eat GM or Non-GM food
allowing for an “I don’t know” or “I don’t care” selection. Less than three-percent of
respondents selected “I don’t care” in response to the question which is indicative that
most of our sample has some preference for consumption of GM foods. Over half of
the sample (56%) prefer to eat Non-GM foods. Interestingly, sixteen percent of our
sample claim to prefer eating GM food. We did not ask any follow up to this question.
A quarter of our sample is unsure about consumption preferences between GM and
Non-GM food (table 2.5).
Lastly, participants rated their seafood purchase habits on a five-point Likert
scale to indicate level of agreement with statements about seafood. As expected, based
on prior literature, participants have a general preference for seafood that is wildcaught, domestic, low-priced, freshest, and healthy for them (table 2.6).
2.5.2 Mixed Logit Results
Mixed logit results are summarized in table 2.7. As mentioned above, we observe a
significant, negative price effect which is consistent with economic theory. Overall,
the GM labels have the expected sign based on previous works. Participants are more
likely to choose organic and verified Non-GM salmon fillets compared to a salmon
with no GM production label. Participants are also more likely to choose a verified
Non-GM fillet over a non-labeled fillet compared to the choice between an organic
fillet and a non-labeled fillet, which is interesting as the organic label denotes a
product that meets a stricter standard, which includes a Non-GM verification. As
expected, participants are less likely to choose a GM salmon fillet though are more
likely to choose a GM-fed fillet, in opposition to the literature. This is a new finding
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which we conjecture is related to the attribute definitions provided to participants, as
we highlighted the use of GM-derived fish feed to reduce pressure on wild-caught fish
species. Participants are more likely to choose salmon fillets originating from either
Norway or Chile, which could be due to the fact that few Atlantic Salmon fillets with
U.S. origin are available on the market, due to endangered wild populations and
farming operations only in the state of Maine.
All main effects were strengthened by information treatments, regardless of
treatment received. The positive information about GM food technology did not curb
aversion to GM food products, which is not surprising given the difficulties in shifting
negative associations with food production processes due avoidance of information
that contradicts one’s existing beliefs (Steenkamp 1990). The reduction in demand for
GM products and increased demand for the other labeled products in the DCE caused
by the negative information treatment is further evidence that is consistent with
previous findings suggesting cognitive dissonance and confirmatory biases play a
significant role in food-related decisions (Messer, Costanigro, and Kaiser 2017). We
find evidence that providing positive information along with negative information
about GM food technology, while still reducing demand for GM products overall,
could help mitigate the effect of negative information alone. These results, however,
provide further evidence that decisions about GM foods continue to be subject to the
effects of negativity bias.
2.5.3 Willingness to pay for product attributes
We estimate the distribution of willingness to pay for each attribute using 5,000
replications of the Krinsky-Robb method (Krinsky and Robb 1986). This method has
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been recommended in the literature as it allows for asymmetric confidence intervals
about the mean WTP. For more detailed discussion of this procedure see Hensher,
Rose, and Greene (2015). Table 2.8 provides a summary of WTP for product
attributes. The reference case for each WTP is a salmon fillet originating from the U.S.
with no GM food label and no additional market information. As discussed above, our
sample exhibited higher demand for Norwegian and Chilean produced salmon relative
to U.S. produced salmon and are willing to pay more $1.75 and $1.29 more for each
origin, respectively. Participants had a positive WTP for both organic ($.15) and
Verified Non-GM ($2.04) labeled fillets which is consistent with previous findings.
WTP for a GM-fed fillet is $.94 which is a surprising result and could be an interesting
marketing opportunity for producers. As expected, participants are willing to pay less
for GM labeled salmon fillets ($1.04). Each of the main attributes have 95%
confidence intervals that do not contain zero.
We now turn to the WTP for the GM attributes in the presence of additional
market information. These values are the total WTP for information and GM attribute,
formulated as WTPLABELINFO = (  LABEL +  LABELINFO ) / −  PRICE and estimated using the
same methodology described above. Each information treatment magnified WTP for
each GM label absent additional information. Only WTP for Verified Non-GM and
GM labels are statistically different from zero in the presence of information. The
magnitude of WTP for these two attributes is lowest in the presence of positive
information and highest in the presence of negative information. The magnitude
difference in WTP is nine- and ten-percent higher for Verified Non-GM relative to
GM in the presence of positive and balanced information, respectively, while this

71

difference is nearly thirty-percent in the presence of negative information. These
results are indicative of the polarizing effect of information in the context of
biotechnology.
2.6 Discussion/Conclusion
In the pre-DCE survey, participants ranked foods with an organic label as more likely
to be purchased than foods with a Verified Non-GM label, while exhibiting an
association between both labels. In the mixed logit results, we identify stronger
preference for Verified Non-GM fillets than organic fillets. This contradicts the
rankings participants reported prior to the DCE. While we did provide a definition of
organic that denoted the absence of GM technology in production, perhaps the
stronger preference for Non-GM is explained by the fact that this label is more
transparent. Since the label denotes that the fillets were Verified Non-GM participants
could more easily use this information to refine their preferences associated with GM
food production technology. Though the organic label implies the product is also NonGM, if a consumer is most concerned about the use of GM technology, they are
required to recall that the organic label has this associated implication. This may
require additional inference on the part of the consumer, resulting in potential
confusion and/or misinterpretation of the labels making them ineffective at aligning
consumers’ purchases with their preferences (Messer, Costanigro, and Kaiser 2017).
As noted above, participants were willing to pay a premium for GM-fed fillets
regardless of information treatment, which has not been previously identified in
literature investigating consumer preferences for GM-fed animals. For example, Lusk,
Roosen, and Fox (2003) found participants were willing to pay a premium to avoid
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GM-fed beef, while Kaneko and Chern (2005) found similar results for GM-fed
salmon. As an explanation, we consider the definition used for GM-fed that was
provided to participants during the DCE. The definition read as follows:
Fed with GM Soy - To avoid using wild-caught fish to feed farmed salmon,
some salmon farmers use fish feed containing a soy-based protein alternative.
Approximately 95% of all soy grown in the US is GM. The salmon itself
is NOT GM.5
Previous research has found that consumers are more accepting of biotechnology uses
associated with a tangible benefit, such as increased nutrition or environmental
benefits (Dannenberg 2009; Lusk et al. 2005). Though we cannot explicitly test for
this effect, we conjecture that the definition provided for the GM-fed label acted as
product-specific benefit information, which in turn resulted in willingness to pay a
premium for GM-fed salmon. Under the NBFDS, products derived from animals
consuming GM feed are currently not mandated to require a label. Our results may be
informative to producers for product differentiation strategies or tactics to counter-act
negative press associated with production processes.
2.6.1 Ineffective information
We find that information is ineffective at shifting consumer demand for foods that use
biotechnology in production processes. We find instead that information, regardless of
its support of biotechnology, has a relatively uniform effect on consumer demand.
Specifically, information has a polarizing effect, strengthening participants’ demand
for fillets with each of the production process labels no matter which information

5

We are confident in the content validity of this definition based on the discussion in a variety of
sources (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2016; Naylor et al. 2009; Tacon and
Metian 2008) as well as feedback from focus group participants prior to survey deployment.
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treatment they received. Previous works have found similar findings in regard to the
effect of information on consumer preferences for GM food products (e.g. Frewer,
Howard, and Shepherd 1998; Peters 1998). The only exception is demand for fillets
with a GM-fed label given the balanced information treatment. Participants in this
experimental condition exhibited no significant change in demand for this product
attribute.
Considering the positive information condition, we conjecture information was
ineffective at increasing demand for GM fillets due to participants’ preference for
Non-GM foods identified in responses to the food purchase and preference questions
leading up to the DCE. As discussed above, participants were asked if they preferred
to eat GM or Non-GM to which 56% of participants reported a preference for NonGM foods. Thus, the majority of our sample has a preference for Non-GM food
products, while 28% reported that they either do not know or do not care about a
preference for GM relative to Non-GM. Given this preference profile of our sample,
our results corroborate the previously identified ineffectiveness of benefit information
to shift consumer preferences toward support of biotechnology in the presence of prior
opposition (Scholderer and Frewer 2003). Though the effects of information are not
statistically different from one another, we do find evidence that positive information
leads to less extreme polarization in demand for these product attributes.
2.6.2 More effective science communication
Scholderer and Frewer (2003) say communication strategies related to biotechnology
have focused on “engaging consumers in the debate about innovation processes rather
than attempting to align their views with those held by expert communities.” While
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labels can promote consumer information search and education, search results usually
lead consumers to mass media sources which have a known tendency to focus on
reporting negative aspects of a topic. This is an issue in terms of aligning consumer
perceptions with scientific evidence, as scientific results are produced at a much
slower pace than media sensations (Messer et al. 2017).
We find participants in our DCE are 1) willing to pay more for Fed-GM
salmon given a Fed-GM label/ definition combination, and 2) willing to pay a
premium above the definition/label combination when provided general benefit
information about GM technology. Based on these results, we second the
recommendation put forth by Messer et al. (2017) regarding the provision of
secondary information along with the labels at the point of purchase to help mitigate
the potentially negative effect of the forthcoming NBFDS. Specifically, we propose
providing product-specific benefit information alongside general benefit information
about biotechnology in conjunction with the labels. These results provide further
support for recommendations posed recently in the marketing literature to promote
GM foods as “a man-made object created with intent” (Hingston and Noseworthy
2018). Qin and Brown (2006) posited similar recommendations after conducting focus
groups centered on the topic of GM salmon saying that communication about GM
applications “should contain basic and specific, including process- and productrelated, information to…help consumers reach informed opinions” (pg. 262).
The NBFDS was finalized in December 2018 with full implementation to occur by
2020. Taking our results together with previous findings we see food retailers as an
outlet to provide general/balanced information about genetic modification and
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product-/process-specific information to complement the informative role of the
NBFDS. Maintaining transparency and openness throughout this informing process
can be constructive in fulfilling consumers demand for information about genetic
modification, while helping mitigate the effects of potential or pre-existing stigmas.
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Table 2.1 Sample summary statistics

Age
Female (%)
Income (%)
Less than $49,999
$50,000 - 99,999
$100,000 - 149,999
Greater than $150,000
Education (%)
Less than high school
High School degree
Some college or Associate's
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional degree
Household size (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 or more
Race (%)
White
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native American or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
Observations

Mean
35.9
40.1

SD
11.0
49.0

2016 ACS
37.7
51.60

48.5
37.1
5.8
2.7

50.0
48.3
23.5
16.2

45.4
30.0
13.5
11.1

0.4
9.4
29.0
42.5
57.5

6.3
29.2
45.4
49.5
49.5

12.5
27.2
29.0
19.3
11.9

19.5
26.7
24.2
18.8
6.8
3.0
0.9

39.7
44.2
42.9
39.1
25.2
17.1
9.5

27.7
33.7
15.7
13.1
6.0
2.3
1.5

74.7
13.5
7.0
1.8
4.3
0.4
0.9
1043

43.5
34.2
25.5
13.5
20.2
6.2
9.3

73.3
12.6
17.3
0.8
5.2
0.2
4.8

Note: 2016 ACS column reports mean values from the 2016 American Community Survey, except
age which is reported as a median. ACS summary of household size includes both family and
nonfamily households.
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Table 2.2 DCE attributes and levels
Atlantic Salmon Fillets
Price
6.49
9.99
13.49
16.99
GM Label

No Label
Organic
Verified Non-GM
GM-Fed
GM

Origin

U.S.
Norway
Chile
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Table 2.3 Importance of labeling
How important is it to
label the following food
categories?
Organic
Non-GM
Contains GM Ingredients
GM-Fed
GM

Not at all
9.54
13.27
15.77
17.43
16.65

Slightly Moderately Very Extremely
13.15
20.25
32.23
24.83
14.73
21.27
26.15
24.59
16.07
18.5
24.15
25.51
15.97
19.08
23.76
23.76
15
16.36
24.44
27.56

Note: Reported as percentage of respondents selecting given response.
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Table 2.4 Label ranking summary

Rank
1
2
3
4

Label Text
Organic
Certified Non-GMO
Contains GM Ingredients
Produced with Genetic Engineering
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Average
Rank
1.61
1.91
3.00
3.24

SD
0.89
0.87
0.82
0.97

Table 2.5 Preference for GM/Non-GM food

Prefer to eat GM
Prefer to eat Non-GM
I don't care
I don't know
Total

Frequency Percent
166
16.15
576
56.03
28
2.72
258
25.1
1028
100
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Cumulative Percent
16.15
72.18
74.9
100

Table 2.6 Seafood preferences
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I buy seafood that is…
Low priced
Most fresh
Tastes best
From USA
Caught in the wild
Caught locally
Low in fat content
Healthy for me
Recommended by fish seller

Strongly
Disagree
7.02
1.17
1.18
3.33
3.41
6.95
9.08
1.27
5.95

Disagree
20.98
4.1
2.64
10.87
10.54
13.7
17.97
4.99
12.59

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
18.54
12.88
9.89
29.68
25.07
29.35
28.61
15.26
31.8

Agree
41.27
34.44
35.65
31.93
35.9
31.6
28.22
41.19
33.07

Strongly
Agree
12.2
47.41
50.64
24.19
25.07
18.4
16.11
37.28
16.59

N
1025
1025
1021
1025
1021
1022
1024
1022
1025

Table 2.7 Mixed logit results
Fillet Choice
Coefficient Standard Error
Random parameters in utility functions
No Purchase
-7.53***
0.54
Price
-0.29***
0.03
Organic
0.04***
0.01
Verified Non-GM
0.66***
0.13
GM-fed
0.33**
0.17
GM
-0.38***
0.14
Norway
0.46***
0.15
Chile
0.38***
0.12
Positive Information x GM Label
Organic
0.41*
0.24
Verified Non-GM
1.44***
0.26
GM-fed
0.73***
0.24
GM
-1.58***
0.33
Negative Information x GM Label
Organic
0.5**
0.20
Verified Non-GM
2.71***
0.57
GM-fed
0.63**
0.27
GM
-1.84***
0.36
Balanced Information x GM Label
Organic
0.89***
0.23
Verified Non-GM
1.74***
0.42
GM-fed
-0.35
0.28
GM
-1.61***
0.32
Standard deviations of random parameters
No Purchase
9.12***
0.80
Price
0.5***
0.03
Organic
0.05***
0.02
Verified Non-GM
1.3***
0.23
GM-fed
1.14***
0.28
GM
1.06***
0.36
Norway
1.17***
0.42
Chile
1.2***
0.20
Positive Information x GM Label
Organic
1.51**
0.71
Verified Non-GM
1.58***
0.33
GM-fed
3.23***
0.55
GM
3.19**
1.26
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Table 2.7 (continued) Mixed logit results
Negative Information x GM Label
Organic
2.1***
Verified Non-GM
5.09***
GM-fed
2.78***
GM
3.32***
Balanced Information x GM Label
Organic
2.74***
Verified Non-GM
4.52***
GM-fed
2.86***
GM
3.86***
Log-likelihood
Chi squared [ 184 d.f.]
McFadden Pseudo R-squared
Observations

0.36
0.76
0.56
0.45
0.37
0.59
0.44
0.75

-4747.6373
3797.93401
0.2857048
6050

Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Results based
on 200 Halton draws. All parameters are assumed to be normally
distributed and correlated.
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Table 2.8 Willingness to pay summary

Mean
Attribute
Organic
0.15
Verified Non-GM
2.04
Fed GM
0.94
GM
-1.04
Norway
1.75
Chile
1.29
WTP with Positive Information
Organic
0.69
Verified Non-GM
6.89
Fed GM
2.94
GM
-6.32
WTP with Negative Information
Organic
1.74
Verified Non-GM
10.70
Fed GM
2.81
GM
-8.27
WTP with Balanced Information
Organic
3.15
Verified Non-GM
7.99
Fed GM
-0.97
GM
-7.25

95% Confidence
Interval

% Premium
(Discount)

[0.07, 0.23]
[1.71, 2.39]
[0.63, 1.26]
[-1.29, -0.78]
[1.42, 2.09]
[1.06, 1.52]

1.28
17.38
8.01
-8.86
14.91
10.99

[-4.8, 6.11]
[1.52, 12.30]
[-2.41, 8.27]
[-11.62, -0.96]

5.88
58.69
25.04
-53.83

[-3.51, 7.10]
[5.25, 16.17]
[-2.67, 8.27]
[-13.77, -3.02]

14.82
91.14
23.94
-70.44

[-2.05, 8.64]
[2.56, 13.50]
[-6.46, 4.45]
[-12.58, -2.03]

26.83
68.06
-8.26
-61.75

Note: 95% Confidence intervals created using 5,000 replications of the Krinsky -Robb procedure.
Bolded values indicate significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 2.1 Example choice menu
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By
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Abstract
We expand the relatively new body of literature related to prediction policy problems
by applying a least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) as means of
model selection to evaluate the potential effects of the National Bioengineered Food
Disclosure Standard. The primary goal of the paper is to develop a predictive model of
consumer choice by incorporating overlooked behavioral measures into our choice
model. We also provide a methodological contribution by applying a random sampling
routine to select a more parsimonious sub-model of the regularized model. Our
findings show that 1) health and environmental risk perceptions, confidence and
concern about potential health and environmental risks, subjective knowledge, and
ambiguity aversion in the domain of GM foods are significant predictors of salmon
fillet choice and 2) LASSO-regularized models can be made even more sparse without
compromising out of sample fit or prediction accuracy.
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3.1 Introduction
Prediction problems are prevalent and important in policy evaluation studies. New
advances in machine learning are increasingly being adapted by economists to
investigate these problems (Mullainathan and Spiess 2017; Kleinberg et al. 2015).
Machine learning methods excel at addressing these types of problems due to their
ability to discover complex data structures that are not specified or known a priori.
This is in stark contrast to many applied economic applications focused on parameter
estimation and causal inference. Recent applications of machine learning in policy
prediction problems include environmental monitoring (Hino, Benami, and Brooks
2018), judicial behavior (Kleinberg et al. 2017), changes in household diet (Hut and
Oster 2018; Emily Oster Forthcoming), poverty quantification (Blumenstock 2016;
Jean et al. 2016; Blumenstock, Cadamuro, and On 2015), tax policy evaluation
(Andini et al. 2018), restaurant hygiene inspections (Kang et al. 2013), and highway
procurement auctions (Jung 2019).
We expand this literature by applying LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and
selection operator) penalized regression to identify behavioral factors that predict
consumer choice in the context of seafood purchases. Specifically, we investigate the
potential impact of the forthcoming National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard
(NBFDS) on demand for Atlantic Salmon. On July 29, 2016 the NBFDS was signed
into law (Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-296 2016) and was
finalized in December 2018. The Standard is set to be fully implemented on January 1,
2020 (Boudreau 2018). As it currently stands, foods containing any of the
commercially available GM foods and their derivatives will be subject to disclosure,
while small food manufacturers, restaurants, animals fed with GM products, and foods
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certified under the National Organic Program are exempt (Agricultural Marketing Act
of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-296 2016). Disclosure will be carried out via written text, a
symbol similar to the USDA Organic symbol, or electronically using QR codes. A
recent ruling by the Food and Drug administration motivated by the final NBFDS
approval, the import ban on GM salmon eggs has been lifted (Blank 2019). This
means that production of GM salmon in the United States is likely to begin in the near
future with products reaching seafood counters by 2021 (Blank 2018).
Labels presented under current institutions, including the forthcoming NBFDS,
act as a signal of quality and safety for consumers (Lusk and Rozan 2008). Generally,
the information provided in a food label is expected to be a positive course of action
by providing more information than was previously available. However, labels can be
ineffective if the information is misperceived (Bonroy and Constantatos 2014). For
example, consumers may over-estimate risks related to the labeled product, perceiving
the label as a type of warning, resulting in the (unintended) effect of decreased
consumption (Marette and Roosen 2011; Lusk and Rozan 2008; Liu, Huang, and
Brown 1998). This ineffectiveness can be related to inferential processing on the part
of the consumer. From a public policy standpoint, this is undesirable because label
interpretation is reliant upon consumers’ subjective beliefs (Messer, Costanigro, and
Kaiser 2017; Steenkamp 1990).
Studies have shown that risk perceptions, preferences, and other intangible
aspects are becomingly increasingly important in consumer food choice (Lusk and
Coble 2005; Petrolia 2016; Messer, Costanigro, and Kaiser 2017), but no work has
addressed which subjective/behavioral measures are most important. Considering the
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controversy associated with the NBFDS itself and the use of GM technology in food
production in general, behavioral measures are likely to have significant influence on
the effectiveness of the NBFDS and ultimately consumer choice. Considering the
importance of behavioral measures and the forthcoming NBFDS, we have a unique
opportunity to explore this policy prediction problem using machine learning
techniques. The goal of our study is two-fold.
First, we seek to develop a predictive model of consumer choice by
incorporating often-overlooked behavioral measures into our choice model (Lusk and
Coble 2005). Inclusion of these data and other “non-conventional” measures is
important given the potentially significant effects they can have on predictive accuracy
of choice models (Loewenstein 2000). Developing an accurate predictive model that
incorporates this data is particularly important in evaluating the potentially unintended
consequences of policy interventions such as the NBFDS.
Second, we contribute to the methodology of using machine learning
algorithms in policy prediction problems. Using a random sampling routine, we
compare prediction performance of the (LASSO-) regularized model with that of a
more parsimonious model, what we refer to as the “Intersection” model. If economists
are interested in developing predictive models to promote as decision support tools,
then balancing model complexity with predictive performance is a critical
consideration. Overly complex predictive models may require large amounts of
(potentially unavailable) data or may be difficult to implement. If this is the case, then
these tools become a barrier to decisions in stark contrast to the goal that motivates
their development.
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Our results show that behavioral measures do indeed play an important role in
predicting consumer choice. Specifically, we find that risk perception, confidence in
risk perceptions and concern about the risks associated with GM technology are the
prominent behavioral factors in the health domain. Risk perception, confidence in risk
perceptions, and concern are also important behavioral factors in the environmental
domain. Both context specific subjective knowledge and ambiguity aversion have a
significant influence on consumer choice of salmon fillets. In terms of methodological
contributions, we find that models selected by the LASSO can be made still more
parsimonious using our intersection approach without compromising out of sample fit
or out of sample prediction accuracy.

3.1.1 Background
When shopping for food, labels act as signals to consumers (Lusk and Rozan 2008).
GM food labels will act as a signal of quality and safety for consumers deciding on
what to purchase. This aligns with groups that advocate for consumer “right to know”
about what goes into their food. Generally, information provided via a food label is
expected to be a positive course of action, as labels are meant to correct for the lack of
information previously available to consumers. In the case of GM foods, labels are
desired to as an attempt correct the information asymmetry regarding food production
processes of many food products available on the market. Advocates of the NBFDS
cite unknown environmental and health consequences of production and consumption
of GM products as justification for distinction of GM foods from conventional
products as a means of facilitating informed consumer choice. The most prevalent
issues in the discussion are unanticipated allergic responses, spread of pest resistance
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or herbicide tolerance to wild plants, and inadvertent harm to wildlife (Curtis,
McCluskey, and Wahl 2004). Aside from the tangible risks often associated with GM
products, other studies have shown moral acceptability to be a significant predictor for
the encouragement of biotechnology applications (Amin et al. 2014; Gaskell et al.
2004)
Bonroy and Constantatos (2014) note that labels can be less effective at fixing
the lack of information issue given consumer misperceptions of the information
provided by the label. One form of misperception can be an over- or under- estimation
of risks or benefits related to a product attribute (Marette and Roosen 2011). This type
of misperception is related to what Lusk and Rozan (2008) call the “red flag effect”
and is attributed to (undesired) inferential processing on the part of the consumer
(Messer, Costanigro, and Kaiser 2017; Steenkamp 1990). If one considers the varying
attitudes and opinions as an alternate form of “advertising” for GM foods, it becomes
clear that this ambiguous advertising may influence consumer evaluation of GM
product safety and quality, and ultimately the magnitude of the “red flag” effect (Hoch
and Ha 1986).
As is the case with GM foods, lack of information related to a specific decision
or choice may lead to ambiguity in the consumer’s evaluation of the probability of an
outcome, such as health or environmental impacts of GM food consumption. This
transformation of information ambiguity to probability ambiguity can influence
individual decision-making (Snow 2010). Even in the context of food-borne
pathogens, few consumers know the odds of becoming ill from it and many consumers
have ill-formed beliefs about their chances of actually becoming ill from a food-borne
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pathogen (Kivi and Shogren 2010). Further, when individuals seek out information in
an attempt to gain more information on a topic, there is seldom consensus among
interest groups or between lay people and the scientific community, particularly
regarding GM foods as mentioned above (Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1999).
It is common in situations of uncertain origin or outcome that lay peoples’ risk
perceptions will differ from expert provided technical risk estimates (Kaptan, Fischer,
and Frewer 2018; Hansen et al. 2003). We know from the works discussed above that
this difference in perception hinders the effectiveness of expert provided information
meant to alleviate the information asymmetry (Frewer et al. 1997). We conjecture that
the contrasting states of knowledge among interest groups and ultimately the
information available to consumers, plays a significant role in driving consumer
aversion to genetically modified food products. Given the lack of consensus on the
consequences of genetic modification, we argue that this may reinforce consumer
aversion to GM technology in food, and thus ambiguity aversion drives preferences
for GM food and demand for a labeling regime such as NBFDS.
It is a natural extension to discuss risk perceptions along with ambiguity
preferences in the evaluating the effectiveness of the NBFDS as these measures are
often overlooked in explaining consumer demand for food products (Lusk and Coble
2005). However, assessing risk perceptions’ effect on consumer choice can be difficult
as comprehensive measurement of risk perception is not trivial.
Risk perception as a concept is multidimensional, meaning that a single
question on a survey may not capture all the nuances of individual risk perception (van
der Linden 2017; Meagher 2018; Hansen et al. 2003; Slovic 1999). A large body of
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work exists in the risk communication field focused on measuring risk perceptions in
the context of climate change. Van der Linden (2017) discusses the fact that while the
public might perceive some long-term changes in long-term climate conditions,
psychological factors are often much more influential in determining public perception
of climate change risk. We utilize a framework proposed in van der Linden (2017) to
measure and interpret our results. This framework breaks down risk perception into a
hierarchy of components which allows us to identify the relative importance of each
component of risk perception in explaining consumer demand for GM salmon under
the NBFDS.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Sample Characteristics
We recruited 1,041 survey participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (denoted
“Mturk”). Mturk workers with greater than zero approved tasks, task approval rating
greater than 97%, and located in the United States saw the survey announcement for a
“20-minute Academic Study”. Our final sample consists of a diverse group of
respondents from every state in the United States aside from Delaware, Table 3.1
provides sample summary statistics. Compared to the most recent American
Community Survey (United States Census Bureau 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), our sample
differs from the general population of the United States primarily in gender
distribution (40.1% female compared to 50.8% in the ACS) and educational
attainment (60% with Bachelor’s degree or higher compared to 31.2% in the ACS),
consistent with previous summaries of the Mturk population (Goodman and Paolacci
2017). We consider our sample to be sufficiently representative of U.S. seafood
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consumers given our screening criteria, acknowledging these previously identified
nuances of the Mturk population.
We have further confidence in considering our sample to be sufficiently
representative of the U.S. seafood consumers based on their prior preferences and
attitudes related to GM food technology. Between 50-60% of our sample believe it is
either “Very Important” or “Extremely Important” to label each of Organic, Non-GM,
Contains GM ingredients, GM-fed, and GM food products (Table 3.3). This is
representative of the general sentiment of consumer “right to know” movements and
use of information regarding food production methods identified in various academic
work as well as independent polls. For example, a Pew Research Center poll (2016)
found that 89% of respondents (n = 1,480) believe the general public should play at
least a minor role in making policy decisions related to GM foods, while 40% of
respondents believe the news media does not take the health risks of GM foods
seriously enough.
As an alternate means of capturing prior preferences related to production
process labeling, participants were asked to rank four food labels based on likelihood
of purchasing a product displaying each label: Organic, Certified Non-GMO, Contains
GM Ingredients, and Produced with Genetic Engineering. As we expected based on
the prior preferences summarized above, participants ranked Organic as most likely to
be purchased, followed by Certified Non-GMO, Contains GM ingredients, and
Produced with Genetic Engineering. We did allow participants to rank multiple labels
equally to indicate indifference. The rankings are indicative of an association between
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Organic and Certified Non-GMO labels and Contains GM Ingredients and Produced
with Genetic Engineering labels as evidenced by their relative average rankings.
As we are studying GM food labels in the context of seafood, we also had participants
rate their seafood purchase habits on a five-point Likert scale to indicate level of
agreement with statements about seafood. As expected, based on prior literature,
participants have a general preference for seafood that is wild-caught, domestic, lowpriced, freshest, and healthy for them.
2.3.2 DCE and Survey Design
We designed a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to simulate seafood purchase
scenarios for fresh, farmed Atlantic Salmon fillets and canned, farmed Atlantic
Salmon with different labels denoting presence or absence of genetic modification,
country of origin, and price. The survey instrument also asked respondents questions
about their food consumption habits, general attitudes toward food and technology,
and specific attitudes toward GM foods. Table 3.2 summarizes the levels of each
product attribute used in our DCE, which were chosen based on previous literature and
current market conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
information treatment groups that differed in support of GM technology in food
production. The positive (negative) information groups received information generally
supportive (disapproving) of GM technology. The balanced treatment is a combination
of both the positive and negative information treatments. The control group received
no further information.
We used a full factorial design with each respondent answering a total of six
salmon fillet choices. Due to the large number of total choices (4 x 5 x 3 = 60 total
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combinations for salmon) we blocked our choice sets to reduce the cognitive burden
on our participants. The design was created in STATA version 13 with the userwritten program dcreate6 (StataCorp 2013; Hole 2015). Each respondent was
randomly assigned to one choice set block. Each choice question had two choice
alternatives plus a no purchase option. The order of each question in a given block was
randomized for each participant. Figure 3.1 is an example fillet choice set.
3.2.2 Behavioral measures
Prior to seeing the choice scenarios, participants answered questions regarding their
knowledge level and risk perceptions related to GM technology. We refer to this series
of questions as “behavioral measures” (including our ambiguity aversion measure
discussed below). The questions specifically addressed participants’ 1) knowledge
level about the facts and issues associated with GM technology, 2) risk perception of
GM foods relative to foods produced without GM, 3) confidence in risk perception,
and 4) concern-level about potentially negative impacts of GM foods. Specifically, the
risk perception series of questions was presented as follows:
1)

How much do you agree with the following statement?
GM foods pose a greater (health/environmental) risk than foods
produced without GM technology.

2)

How confident are you in your answer to the previous question?

3)

How concerned are you about GM foods leading to negative
[health, environmental] impacts?

6

Assuming naïve priors and including an alternative specific constant for the opt-out alternative, our
design has a D-error of 0.237 assuming only a main effects model. Assuming an interaction effect
between the GM label and country of origin our design has a D-error of 0.484.
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This series was asked separately for the health and environmental domains. The risk
perception series and self-reported knowledge level were measured on a five-point
Likert scale.
We elicited this specific series of behavioral measures to capture the
relationship between these variables in a similar manner as van der Linden (2017). In
their work, van der Linden developed a “hierarchy of concern” (HoC) model to
conceptualize public perception of climate change similar to Maslow’s “hierarchy of
needs” framework for human motivation. The HoC establishes a transitive relationship
between likelihood of an event, perceived seriousness, general concern, and personal
worry. For reasoning similar to the climate change case, an individual may think that
effects of consuming and/or producing genetically modified foods are likely to occur,
but that does not imply that they perceive the issue to be serious. The relationship
between each level of the hierarchy is comparable to the example above. The
transitivity axiom is not a necessary condition for this framework to remain a useful
tool for conceptualizing risk perceptions of genetic modification, climate change, or
other issues. Figure 3.2 presents a pictorial representation of the hierarchy measured
for our study.
The highest level in the HoC is personal worry. This level distinguishes
concern at a societal versus a personal level. This distinction can be important as
individuals often exhibit optimism bias in which they overestimate the likelihood of
positive life events and underestimate the likelihood of negative events. The resulting
bias translates into overestimates of risk perceptions if measures only rely on single
question to capture concern level. Since we are not interested in analyzing the specific
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level of public concern about the risks of GM technology, we opted to only use a
single-question measure of concern and personal worry levels. We purposely used a
concern measure that could be subjectively interpreted as a means of capturing an
overall level of concern about the risks of GM technology rather than only societal- or
personal-level concern.
We are also interested in establishing the relationship food purchases have with
subjective knowledge and ambiguity aversion. The relationship between subjective
knowledge and ambiguity aversion was proposed and tested in Fox and Tversky’s
(1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis. The authors’ work concludes that as
subjective knowledge (how knowledgeable you feel about a topic) increases, so too
does ambiguity aversion. A related explanation lies in Heath and Tversky’s (1991)
competence hypothesis. Costa-Font (2013) formally tests the link between these
variables in the context of three food scares, which included GM food technology.
One important result is the confirmation of subjective knowledge having a positive
and significant effect on ambiguity aversion in line with the results of Fox and
Tversky (1995) and Heath and Tversky (1991).

3.2.3 Ambiguity aversion elicitation
Along with the behavioral measures outlined above, we elicited participants’ aversion
to ambiguity. We developed a domain-specific ambiguity aversion elicitation
mechanism as there is evidence that effects of behavioral measures could depend on
how measures are elicited (Petrolia 2016). Specifically, participants iterated through a
series of choice menus that asked them to make a choice between a salmon fillet with
a known chance of being GM and a fillet with an unknown chance of being GM. This
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method was developed as an adaption of that used by Dimmock, Kouwenberg,
Mitchell, and Peijnenburg (2015). Figure 3.3 presents an example “lottery” menu. We
are aware of only one other work that that framed an ambiguity measure in the context
of a specific food product or category (Costa-Font 2013). The measure used by CostaFont relied on a single question that was asked participants to choose a country to live
in (Country A or Country B) based on known or vague information about deaths
associated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy. This was adapted from a measure
used by Viscusi (1997).
We truncated the tails of the distribution for elicitation purposes based on
discussions with colleagues that have used this elicitation method in similar
applications. Thus, our measure falls in the range [.15, .85] rather than [0, 1.0]. The
menus were designed in the loss frame based on current negative perceptions of GM
technology. Participants are ambiguity averse if

 , the individual level ambiguity

aversion parameter, is greater than 0.5. Based on this definition, 26.65% of our sample
is considered ambiguity averse. Figure 3.4 presents the distribution of

 in our

sample.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Mixed Logit
Since every choice elicitation includes a no-purchase option in addition to the two
fillets, we consider multinomial logit models to estimate choice. A random-parameters
logit framework relaxes the independence assumption necessary in a traditional
multinomial logit. This framework allows us to appropriately account for the panel
structure of our data, in which choice errors may not be independent within
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individuals. The model accounts for the panel structure by including a random
intercept term for each participant and participant-choice set combination. All other
covariates are specified as fixed effects (i.e., non-random effects, not to be confused
with dummy variables used in fixed effects regression). Our empirical specification
includes a total of 192 covariates that include an alternative specific constant (ASC)
for the no-purchase alternative, choice set attributes (price, country of origin, and GM
label; described in Table 3.2), and interactions of the behavioral measures with all
choice set attributes.
3.3.2 LASSO Penalized Regression
We use the LASSO L1-regularization to select the most important behavioral
measures for predicting participant choices (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009).
Since these measures are correlated, the selection of a sparse model is based on the
explicit assumption that there is a subset of our measures that is more important in
predicting choice behavior. We follow Huseynov, Kassas, Segovia, and Palma (2018)
to reformulate the LASSO in a logit framework.
All independent measures are standardized prior to estimating a maximum
binomial likelihood to fit the LASSO to our training data. Specifying an individual’s
non-selection probability as

p( xit ) = Pr ( yit = 0 | X it ) , we maximize the following log-

likelihood:
1 N

max    I ( yit = 0)log p( xit ) + I ( yit = 1)log (1 − p ( xit )) −   || 1  .

 N i=1


(1)

We ran 100 iterations of a modified two-fold cross-validation LASSO routine to
confirm the stability of the optimal tuning parameter. Each iteration used a randomly
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selected 50-50 split (permutation) of the full data into training and test data sets. This
split for cross validation routines has been shown to be optimal for a broad class of
loss functions independent of the data distribution, and particularly in the case of
classification via logistic regression (Afendras and Markatou 2015, working paper).
For each replication, the LASSO was fit on the training data and out-of-sample loglikelihood (OOSLL) was calculated using the test data. We fit 22 values of lambda
ranging in penalty strength. This range is slightly smaller relative to other applications
and defaults of popular software packages that typically evaluate 30-100 values of the
tuning parameter, see for example Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani (2010). We
decided to focus our attention on this range of candidate tuning parameters based on
preliminary analysis conducted using this data set. For each iteration and value of the
tuning parameter, we recorded 1) variable selection, 2) in-sample Bayesian
Information Criteria (BIC), and 3) OOSLL. The OOSLL values we report are
calculated using the regularized model, in which the regression betas represent
maximum a posteriori estimates given a Laplacian prior (Tibshirani 1996).
We used the results from the routine described above to select the optimal
tuning parameter, 𝜆∗ , based on average OOSLL and mean prediction accuracy across
the replications. Once we determined the optimal tuning parameter, 𝜆∗ , we re-ran the
LASSO on our full data set with that penalty term to generate the list of covariates
with non-zero coefficient estimates. This set of covariates was used to estimate a naïve
post-LASSO model fit, discussed below, to conduct inference on the effect of these
covariates on seafood purchase decisions. We account for the use of this naïve postLASSO inference method using bootstrapped standard errors based on 100 bootstrap
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replications. Below, we discuss the variables selected by this procedure in order to
identify the important behavioral measures for consumer purchasing of GM seafood.
In addition to the above, we use the results of our resampling routine to specify
a more parsimonious model than that of the cross-validated LASSO. Specifically, we
are interested in evaluating the performance of LASSO in balancing bias and variance
by considering how well it balances parsimony and complexity. We evaluate this
balance by using the results of our replication analysis to specify an “intersection”
model, specified by taking the intersection of covariates with non-zero betas after
regularization across all 100 iterations.
3.4 Results
All models were fit implementing the R package glmmLasso (Groll 2017; R Core
Team 2018). We utilized Elastic Cloud Computing instances on Amazon Web
Services to alleviate computing constraints. Based on the results of our replication
analysis, the optimal tuning parameter is  * = 100 . Figure 3.5 plots the average
OOSLL for each value of the tuning parameter we tested. Figure 3.6 plots average
prediction accuracy at each value of the tuning parameter tested in our resampling
analysis.
The fitted model includes 155 covariates after LASSO regularization using 𝜆∗ ,
denoted Lasso* in the text and figures to follow. The Intersection model includes only
98 covariates, as the remaining 57 covariates appeared only in some of the models
generated by our resampling scheme, but not all. This list of 98 covariates is a perfect
subset of the 155 covariates retained in the Lasso* model. Table 3.3 summarizes the
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included covariates for direct effects and provides counts of behavioral measure
interactions included in each approach.
Prior to presenting our findings, a discussion about inference in regularized
regression is necessary. In an application such as ours where regularized regression is
used for variable selection, we are using the data to sparse a full set of covariates into
a sub-model that was not known or specified a priori. The problem arises due to the
fact that when fitting the sub-model for the purposes of inference, we are looking at
the data twice: once to determine the sub-set of covariates and once to test hypotheses
(Zhao, Shojaie, and Witten 2017, working paper). There are a variety of methods
proposed to deal with this selection bias like sample-splitting (Cox 1975),
simultaneous inference (Berk et al. 2013), exact post-selection inference methods (Lee
et al. 2016; Tibshirani et al. 2016), as well as double-selection methods (Belloni,
Chernozhukov, and Hansen 2013). All of these methods account for the regularization
procedure to compute adjusted p-values, conditional on the particular sub-model being
selected. Under certain conditions, the naïve post-LASSO inference approach that
simply refits the sparse model on the full data set not accounting for regularization can
provide valid p-values and confidence intervals (Zhao, Shojaie, and Witten 2017,
working paper).
All the selective inference approaches mentioned above have been developed
and validated in the context of models that assume only fixed (non-stochastic)
parameter estimates. We are unaware of developments in the selective inference
literature that address the case of selective inference issues in mixed models, as is the
case for our work. It would be ideal to compute adjusted p-values and confidence
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intervals conditional on the regularization routine. However, given the lack of
available methods for computing adjusted p-values and confidence intervals in the
case of regularized mixed models, we are limited in the way we handle selective
inference in our case. Thus, we report bootstrapped standard errors for each coefficient
in our final models to account for potential issues associated with selection bias that is
inherent in using a feature selection tool like LASSO. Bootstrapping standard errors,
under the assumption that our empirical model is correct, allows us to quantify the
uncertainty associated with our parameter estimates.
While we rely on a naïve post-LASSO approach outlined in the literature, we
are confident in the validity of the inference given our relatively large sample size in
relation to the number of considered covariates. In addition, we are not concerned with
issues of endogeneity of our treatment conditions (GM labels) based on the fact that
choice question blocks were randomly assigned to participants. This is the primary
issue considered by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2013). We did evaluate the
correlation between our controls and choice question assignment and found no
evidence of statistically significant correlations. Any significant correlation observed
would be spurious given the random assignment of choice question blocks.

3.4.1 Model fit
In terms of comparing overall model fit between the approaches, Figures 3.5 and 3.6
summarize the average OOSLL and average out of sample predication accuracy for
each value of the tuning parameter. Prediction accuracy was determined by comparing
predicted alternative choice and actual alternative choice for each participant-choice
set pair. Predicted alternative choice was determined using the highest predicted
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choice probability among alternatives from each iteration of the resampling procedure
and at each level of the penalty term. The prediction accuracy is the percent of correct
predictions at each step in the resampling routine.
The data points associated with the optimal model and the Intersection model
are marked by a diamond and X, respectively, in both Figures 3.5 and 3.6. The
takeaway from these figures is that determining a sub-model covariate list by
replicating the regularization procedure does not compromise out of sample fit and, in
fact, can improve both out of sample model fit and out of sample prediction accuracy.
Difference of means tests were conducted using the results of our resampling scheme
as data. Both OOSLL and out of sample prediction accuracy were significantly
improved between the two approaches (p < 0.001). Though the extra prediction
accuracy gained from 55.8% to 56.5% may not be economically significant, this is a
sizeable gain in prediction accuracy in comparison to the null model. Accounting for
the fact that 13.7% of choices in our data were no-purchase decisions, there is a
43.15% chance one of the purchase alternatives would be selected by random chance.
The fact that we are able to accurately predict approximately 56% of choices in our
data set while simultaneously considering both the purchase and no-purchase
alternatives is a substantial improvement over the null model.

3.4.2 Behavioral Measures
As shown in Table 3.3, the regularized model fit on the full data set retained all of the
direct effect attribute levels aside from the GM label attribute. The Intersection model
followed the same pattern while also excluding the Chile label attribute. All behavioral
measures were retained in some form in both modeling approaches which is an early
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indication of their importance in explaining consumer choice in the context of GM
seafood. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the covariates with coefficient estimates
significant at the 99% level based on bootstrapped standard errors for the Lasso* and
Intersection model, respectively. This subset of covariates is materially the same
whether or not we consider bootstrap standard errors. All covariates were standardized
prior to model fitting. As such, we can directly interpret the magnitude of each
coefficient as a measure of relative signal strength. We acknowledge that focusing
only on covariates with 99% significance is an arbitrary decision. However, due to the
large number of implicit hypothesis tests (155 for the Lasso* model and 98 for the
Intersection model) inherent in our analysis we only dedicate time to this subset. The
interested reader is encouraged to contact the authors for further additional summary
figures.
The first notable result in both modeling approaches is the significant and
negative coefficient on fillet price, which is evidence our participants made rational
choices among the choice alternatives (yay economics!). In terms of the other direct
effect variables, we find results consistent with previous findings. Participants prefer
salmon fillets that are Verified Non-GM while they dislike Fed-GM fillets. We also
find that participants dislike imported salmon fillets relative to domestic based on the
negative coefficients on the Norway and Chile attribute indicators. We now consider
the significant behavioral interactions in the Lasso* and Intersection models by
category.
Health domain
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We first focus on the Lasso* model. In the health domain, concern about the health
risks associated with GM technology is present in two of the four significant
interactions. As concern level increases, Fed-GM labeled fillets become less attractive
to consumers. A related observation is that concern level makes the no-purchase
option more attractive. This would imply that consumers would rather not buy salmon
fillets at all as their concern about the health risks of GM technology increased.
Similarly, confidence in health risk perception makes the no-purchase option more
attractive. Confidence in health risk perception level also increases the likelihood of
purchasing Organic salmon for those in the positive information treatment. This is
somewhat unexpected as the information provides benefits of using GM technology in
food production. However, we believe the confidence in risk perception is the driving
force behind this effect. This is indicative of substitution away from GM salmon given
strong prior confidence in health risk perceptions.
The prominent story for the health domain interactions in the Intersection
model is their relationship with the no-purchase option. All of increased risk
perception, confidence and concern about the health risks of GM make the nopurchase option more attractive. Concern about health risks decreases the likelihood of
purchasing both Fed-GM and GM fillets, consistent with our sample’s prior
preferences.
Environment domain
In the environment domain, risk perception decreases the likelihood of purchasing a
Fed-GM or GM fillet given the balanced information treatment. The fact that balanced
information could not override the effects of prior risk perceptions provides further
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support for the negativity bias related to food technology identified in previous works
(Mizerski 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). The result that the interaction
of confidence in environmental risk perception makes Organic fillets less attractive for
those in the balanced information treatment could be driven by those that are confident
GM foods do not pose environmental risks. The justification for this interpretation is
the fact that we are able to separate risk perception from confidence in the risk
perception under the framework of the HoC. Specifically, higher confidence in risk
perception does not necessarily imply a graver risk assessment.
Turning to the Intersection model, we see that increased confidence in
environmental risk assessment of GM foods makes the no purchase alternative less
attractive in contrast to the same interaction in the health domain. This effect is also
present in the Lasso* model. This may be evidence that health risks are more salient
on a personal-level, while environmental risks are more salient on a societal-level
providing an exhibition of optimism bias as described by van der Linden (2017). We
also see that the interaction of confidence in environmental risk perception makes
Organic fillets less attractive for those in the balanced information treatment as in the
full Lasso* specification. Lastly, concern about environmental risks makes Fed GM
fillets more attractive. We believe this could be related to the definition used for the
Fed-GM attribute which mentioned that salmon farmers use plant-based protein
alternatives to reduce pressure on wild-caught species used for fish feed.
Subjective knowledge
There are two interactions with subjective knowledge included in the Lasso* model.
We find a significant and positive effect of subjective knowledge on purchase
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likelihood of Fed-GM fillets, while subjective knowledge decreases the likelihood of
selecting the no-purchase alternative. This second effect is also present in the
Intersection model. As subjective knowledge about GM technology in food production
increases, so does likelihood of purchasing products in this category. Similarly, if
consumers feel knowledgeable about GM technology in food, they perceive no or
minimal information asymmetry about these food products and feel more confident
making decisions that involve them. We consider these results consistent with the
motivation behind “consumer right to know” campaigns.
Ambiguity Aversion
Domain specific ambiguity aversion significantly increases the likelihood of
purchasing Fed-GM salmon. If you are more competent or consider yourself more
competent about GM technology in food, then you are more ambiguity averse in the
domain of GM food. Thus, you prefer “betting” on purchases you are familiar with or
feel knowledgeable about. If you know a product is not GM with certainty, then all
bets are off. This ties directly back to the subjective knowledge measures, as we know
from the literature that these measures increase together, specifically in this domain
(Costa-Font 2013). An alternate phrasing of the results uses the definition of an
ambiguity-averse individual. As individual ambiguity aversion increases, so does the
probability of losses they are willing to accept to avoid making a decision with an
ambiguous outcome. So, ambiguity aversion in the GM domain implies that an
individual would rather buy a fillet with a known high probability of being GM than a
fillet with an unknown probability of being GM.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We find that behavioral measures do play an important role in predicting consumer
choice of seafood products. Specifically, we find that health and environmental risk
perceptions, confidence and concern about potential health risks, confidence and
concern about environmental risks, subjective knowledge, and ambiguity aversion
have a significant influence on consumer choice of salmon fillets. In the context of van
der Linden’s Hierarchy of Concern framework, we see that risk perception,
confidence, and concern about the risks associated with GM technology are the
prominent behavioral factors in both the health and environment domain. Both context
specific subjective knowledge and ambiguity aversion promote consumption of FedGM labeled salmon fillets, which is consistent with the competence hypothesis (Heath
and Tversky 1991) and comparative ignorance hypothesis (Fox and Tversky 1995).
Our results show that familiarity with GM technology is an important
component of demand for GM seafood, as well as the ultimate efficacy of the NBFDS
at addressing the information asymmetry issue in the market for GM seafood. Further,
we provide evidence that familiarity with the use of GM technology in food can
promote consumption of these products. On the other side of this, however, is the fact
that concern and confidence about the potential health and environmental risks
associated with GM technology can push consumers out of the salmon market all
together. These results indicate that while labels under the NBFDS can effectively
promote informed consumer choice, the labels might unintentionally reduce overall
salmon consumption, which is problematic given the already low levels of seafood
consumption in the United States. This is particularly relevant given the recent lift of
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the import ban on AquaAdvantage salmon eggs and large-scale production of the
product.
In light of these findings, it is all the more pressing that future work focuses on
using empirical techniques, like machine learning, to better understand how behavioral
measures might lead to perverse outcomes of the NBFDS. We see strong opportunity
to utilize available data sets such as those associated with the Eurbarometer and/or
Pew Research Center surveys as a means of feasibly investigating this issue. Some
additional considerations to explore as behavioral predictors might include measures
of cultural cognition and social norms as they relate to scientific communication and
public policy (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011). These analyses will continue
to build evidence in support of incorporating “non-conventional” data in models to
improve predictive performance (Huseynov et al. 2018).
In terms of modeling approaches, we have shown that behavioral factors must
be considered in a decision aid should the goal be to predict consumer choice and
evaluate potential policy implications. Our results provide evidence that models
determined by LASSO regularization can be further reduced in dimension without
harming out of sample fit or out of sample prediction (see Table 3.3 and Figures 3.5
and 3.6). In fact, this further reduction in dimension results in improved out of sample
model fit and prediction accuracy. If machine learning techniques are to be used to
develop decision support tools for policy makers, then careful consideration should go
into the development of these decision aids. If prediction is the aim, the Intersection
approach investigated within this work could be a more reasonable tool for policy
makers to use in decision making given it is a more parsimonious sub-model of the
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full set of covariates relative to the Lasso* model. We also deem this approach more
reasonable given its inherently reduced data requirement.
Regardless of the approach adopted, these models can only be as effective as
the data available to decision makers. The European Union (EU) conducts the annual
Eurobarometer to assess public opinion on various topics ranging from trust in
national government to consumer habits regarding fishery and aquaculture products. A
triennial special topic survey focuses on public perception of biotechnology in the EU
and a variety of studies have used the publicly available data set to infer public
perception of GM foods (Gaskell et al. 2004; Gaskell, Hohl, and Gerber 2017). In the
United States, the Pew Research Center conducts similar public surveys and provides
data sets for public use.
We propose that these data sources be more thoroughly utilized by policy
makers to address the policy prediction problem associated with food process labels.
Using these data with a model selection approach like LASSO can help to tease out
important behavioral considerations that, as we have shown, are important in
consumer decision making in the seafood market and can aid in targeting policy
initiatives or strategizing business plans more effectively.
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Table 3.1 Sample Summary Statistics

Age
Female (%)
Income (%)
Less than $49,999
$50,000 - 99,999
$100,000 - 149,999
Greater than $150,000
Education (%)
Less than high school
High School degree
Some college or Associate's
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional degree
Household size (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 or more
Race (%)
White
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native American or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
Observations

Mean
35.9
40.1

SD
11.0
49.0

2016 ACS
37.7
51.60

48.5
37.1
5.8
2.7

50.0
48.3
23.5
16.2

45.4
30.0
13.5
11.1

0.4
9.4
29.0
42.5
57.5

6.3
29.2
45.4
49.5
49.5

12.5
27.2
29.0
19.3
11.9

19.5
26.7
24.2
18.8
6.8
3.0
0.9

39.7
44.2
42.9
39.1
25.2
17.1
9.5

27.7
33.7
15.7
13.1
6.0
2.3
1.5

74.7
13.5
7.0
1.8
4.3
0.4
0.9
1043

43.5
34.2
25.5
13.5
20.2
6.2
9.3

73.3
12.6
17.3
0.8
5.2
0.2
4.8

Note: 2016 ACS column reports mean values from the 2016 American Community Survey, except
age which is reported as a median. ACS summary of household size includes both family and
nonfamily households.
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Table 3.2 DCE attributes and levels
Atlantic Salmon Fillets
Price
6.49
9.99
13.49
16.99
GM Label

No Label
Organic
Verified Non-GM
GM-Fed
GM

Origin

U.S.
Norway
Chile
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Table 3.3 Covariates selected by LASSO regularization

Direct Effects
No Purchase (ASC)
Fillet Price
Organic
Verified Non-GM
Fed with GM Soy
GM
Both GM
Norway
Chile
Information
Positive x Organic
Positive x Verified Non-GM
Positive x Fed with GM Soy
Positive x GM
Positive x Both GM
Negative x Organic
Negative x Verified Non-GM
Negative x Fed with GM Soy
Negative x GM
Negative x Both GM
Balanced x Organic
Balanced x Verified Non-GM
Balanced x Fed with GM Soy
Balance x GM
Balance x Both GM
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Lasso*

Intersection

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y

Table 3.3 (continued) Covariates selected by lasso regularization
Health domain interactions
Risk perception
Confidence in risk perception
Concern about risks
Environmental domain interactions
Risk perception
Confidence in risk perception
Concern about risks
Subjective Knowledge about GM
Ambiguity aversion
Average out-of-sample log-likelihood
Standard error (OOSLL)
Average OOS prediction accuracy
Standard error (OOS pred. accuracy)
Average McFadden’s R-squared
Standard error (McFadden’s R-squared)
Total covariates retained

18
15
19

11
10
11

19
15
18
15
15

11
10
10
9
11

-2896.167
2.934
0.558
0.002
.492
.0005
155

-2883.807
1.626
.565
.001
0.494
.0003
98

Notes: “Y” indicates a variable remained after regularization; “N” indicates
variable was excluded during regularization
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Table 3.4 Significant covariates (99% level), Lasso* fit on full sample

Direct Effects
No Purchase (ASC)
Fillet Price ($)
Verified Non-GM
Fed with GM Soy
Norway
Chile
Health domain interactions
No Purchase (ASC) x Confidence
Positive x Organic x Confidence
No Purchase (ASC) x Concern
Fed with GM Soy x Concern
Environment domain interactions
Balanced x Fed with GM Soy x Risk Perception
Balanced x GM x Risk Perception
No Purchase (ASC) x Confidence
Balanced x Organic x Confidence
Subjective knowledge interactions
No Purchase (ASC)
Fed with GM Soy
Ambiguity aversion interactions
Fed with GM Soy

Fillet Choice
Bootstrap
Coefficient Standard error
0.11
-1.89
0.04
-0.95
0.18
0.47
0.10
-0.70
0.02
-0.22
0.02
-0.32
0.23
0.27
0.49
-0.43

0.09
0.11
0.08
0.10

-0.35
-0.34
-0.21
-0.29

0.11
0.10
0.08
0.10

-0.32
0.39

0.07
0.06

0.24

0.07

Notes: Reported coefficients are significant at the 99% level. Coefficients on continuous
covariates (risk perception, concern, confidence, subjective knowledge, and ambiguity
aversion) are standardized. All other covariates are indicator variables for the denoted label
attributes or experimental conditions.
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Table 3.5 Significant covariates (99% level), Intersection model fit on full sample

Direct Effects
No Purchase (ASC)
Fillet Price ($)
Verified Non-GM
Fed with GM Soy
Norway
Health domain interactions
No Purchase (ASC) x Risk Perception
No Purchase (ASC) x Confidence
No Purchase (ASC) x Concern
Fed with GM Soy x Concern
GM x Concern
Environment domain interactions
No Purchase (ASC) x Confidence
Balanced x Organic x Confidence
Fed with GM Soy x Concern

Fillet Choice
Bootstrap
Coefficient Standard error
0.12
-1.65
0.04
-0.89
0.17
0.45
0.09
-0.49
0.02
-0.06
-0.22
0.25
0.51
-0.29
-0.30

0.08
0.09
0.09
0.07
0.02

-0.23
-0.30
0.26

0.09
0.11
0.07

-0.38

0.07

0.27

0.07

Subjective knowledge interactions
No Purchase (ASC)
Ambiguity aversion interactions
Fed with GM Soy

Notes: Reported coefficients are significant at the 99% level. Coefficients on
continuous covariates (risk perception, concern, confidence, subjective
knowledge, and ambiguity aversion) are standardized. All other covariates are
indicator variables for the denoted label attributes or experimental conditions.

131

Figure 3.1 Example choice set
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Figure 3.2 Hierarchy of Concern framework

Notes: This framework is adapted from van der Linden (2017). “Risk Perception” is a measure of
whether an individual believes there are risk associated with a scenario, e.g. GM food, “Confidence”
refers to the perceived likelihood risks will occur, and “Concern” is the level of worry about the
potential risks.
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Figure 3.3 Example ambiguity aversion elicitation menu
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Figure 3.4 Histogram and smoothed density plot of ambiguity aversion parameter
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Figure 3.5 Mean out of sample log-likelihood

Notes: Diamond denotes mean out of sample log-likelihood of model fit with  * = 100 . X denotes
mean prediction accuracy of Intersection of  * models from replication analysis. The OOSLL for
Lasso* versus intersection are statistically different (p < 0.001).
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Figure 3.6 Mean out of sample prediction accuracy

Notes: Diamond denotes mean prediction accuracy of model fit with  * = 100 . X denotes mean
prediction accuracy of Intersection of  * models from replication analysis. The prediction accuracy of
the Intersection model is significantly different from that of Lasso* (p < 0.001).
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